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ABSTRACT 
Corporate acquisition is among the most important strategic tools wielded by managers to achieve 
competitive advantage. Acquisition may create strategic values for the acquirer by gaining market 
power through industry consolidation, diversifying into rapidly growing industries, entering into 
emerging markets, and most importantly by combining unique valuable resources from acquirer 
and target. Despite the many appealing aspects of the motive for acquisition, however, meta-
analytical studies suggest that though highly beneficial for the target firm’s shareholders, 
acquisition on average destroys acquirer shareholder values. to understand the determinants of 
acquisition performance success, it becomes imperative to study the antecedents as well as 
consequences of acquisition. Existing literature has found scores of potential culprits including 
agency behavior, position in merger wave, managerial hubris, poor acquisition capability in post-
acquisition integration, and loss of valuable human capital resources among others. Beyond 
acquisition performance, acquisition also results in many other intended and unintended 
consequences such as employee turnover and CEO departures. What may affect various 
acquisition outcomes? How do these outcomes affect future acquisition decisions?   
In my dissertation, I look at two additional factors that may affect the success of acquisition by 
conducting two empirical studies on the antecedents as well as consequences of acquisition using 
behavioral and resource based theories. I further explore the connections between the antecedents 
and outcomes of acquisitions. In the second chapter, incorporating risk taking, I focus on the 
influences of alliance and acquisition performance feedback on the rate of future acquisitions. The 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm (BTF) and performance feedback theory have been used to explain 
corporate acquisition behaviors both at the organizational and deal levels. However, extant 
literature does not agree on the relationship between acquisition performance feedback and  
likelihood of subsequent acquisition. Firms may search in different directions in response to 
acquisitions failures. Moreover, we still lack a clear understanding of the behavioral influences on 
the various sourcing mechanisms. To address these questions, we built on both the BTF and 
prospect theory to propose a search hierarchy among corporate sourcing methods. We posit that 
the general search direction in corporate development follows from simple to complex and from 
economical to costly. We hypothesize that, under the duo influences of problemistic search and 
risk taking, deal performance feedback is negatively related to future acquisitions. We further 
investigate the interaction between alliance and acquisition performance feedback on future 
acquisitions.  
In the third chapter, given the importance of human capital retention and turnover in the success 
of acquisition, I examine how target firm’s knowledge base may affect acquirer’s decision to retain 
the target’s CEO. Drawing upon the firm-specific resources and strategic human capital literatures, 
we develop the argument that the level of firm-specific knowledge in an acquisition target may 
affect the likelihood of the target’s CEO being retained after an acquisition. Specifically, due to 
the important role of target CEOs in preserving the value of and integrating firm-specific 
knowledge, we expect a positive relationship between a target’s pre-acquisition firm-specific 
knowledge level and the likelihood that its CEO is retained. Furthermore, we argue that this 
relationship is strengthened by the target’s pre-acquisition performance, which signals a higher 
value of firm-specific knowledge, and the target CEO’s tenure, which is positively associated with 
both the benefit of retaining and the cost of replacing the CEO. Using a sample of acquisitions 
involving US target firms acquired between 1995 and 2006, we find support for our hypotheses. 
 
  
 i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2 CLIMBING THE CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT LADDER: REVISITING 
PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK AND CORPORATE ACQUISITION BEHAVIORS ....................... 4 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................................. 4 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 5 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES .............................................................................................................. 8 
Problemistic Search and Risk Taking ................................................................................................... 8 
Different Hierarchies of Search .......................................................................................................... 12 
Search Hierarchy in Corporate Development Activities ..................................................................... 13 
Deal Specific Performance Feedback ................................................................................................. 15 
Alliance Performance Feedback and Future Acquisitions .................................................................. 16 
Acquisition Performance Feedback and Future Acquisitions ............................................................. 20 
METHODS ............................................................................................................................................. 27 
Data and sample .................................................................................................................................. 27 
Dependent variable ............................................................................................................................. 28 
Independent variables ......................................................................................................................... 28 
Control variables ................................................................................................................................. 30 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS ................................................................................................................ 32 
Robustness Tests ................................................................................................................................. 35 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 37 
GRAPH 1:  Hierarchy of Search in Sickness .......................................................................................... 42 
FIGURE 1: The Moderating Effect of Acquisition Feedback ................................................................ 42 
FIGURE 2: The Moderating Effect of Corporate Diversification .......................................................... 42 
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations ................................................................................. 43 
TABLE 2: Random Effects Future Acquisition Counts in The Next 12 Quarters Results ..................... 43 
TABLE 3: Future Acquisition / Alliance Ratio Random Effects GLS ................................................... 45 
CHAPTER 3:  TARGET KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURE AND POST-ACQUISITION TARGET 
CEO RETENTION ................................................................................................................................... 47 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................ 47 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 48 
BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................... 50 
 ii 
 
Target CEOs Post-Acquisition Turnover ............................................................................................ 50 
Firm-specific Knowledge Resources and the Role of CEOs .............................................................. 52 
THEORY ................................................................................................................................................ 54 
Target Firm-Specific Knowledge and Target CEO Retention in M&A ............................................. 54 
The Moderating Role of Target CEO Tenure ..................................................................................... 57 
The Moderating Role of Target Pre-Acquisition Performance ........................................................... 59 
RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................................................................ 61 
Sample................................................................................................................................................. 61 
Dependent Variable ............................................................................................................................ 62 
Independent Variables......................................................................................................................... 62 
Control Variables ................................................................................................................................ 64 
Estimation Approaches ....................................................................................................................... 66 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS .............................................................. 70 
Alternative Specification of the Firm-Specific Knowledge Variable ................................................. 70 
Alternative Specification of the Dependent Variable ......................................................................... 71 
Alternative Specification of the Target Pre-acquisition Financial Performance ................................. 71 
Ownership Levels in the Target .......................................................................................................... 71 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 72 
Limitations and Future Research ........................................................................................................ 73 
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations .................................................................................. 75 
TABLE 2: Logistic Regression and LPMs Predicting Target CEO Retention ....................................... 76 
FIGURE 1: Plot of The Interaction Between Target Firm-Specific Knowledge and Target CEO’S 
Tenure ..................................................................................................................................................... 78 
FIGURE 2: Plot of The Interaction Between Target Firm-Specific Knowledge and Target Pre-
acquisition Financial Performance .......................................................................................................... 78 
Chapter 4 GENERAL CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 79 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 81 
 
 
 
 
 i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
     In my entire adult life, I strive to live up to the motto by Mahatma Gandhi to “live as if you 
were to die tomorrow. Learn as if you were to live forever.” My unyielding passion for research 
and the relentless pursuit of knowledge took me to SMU to embark on the academic endeavor. I 
enjoy immensely the heavy intellectual undertaking offered by the PhD program at SMU, 
starting from the philosophical course of Introduction to Business Research offered by Prof. 
Reddi Kotha in year one. Henry David Thoreau once said “Such is always the pursuit of 
knowledge. The celestial fruits, the golden apples of the Hesperides, are ever guarded by a 
hundred-headed dragon which never sleeps, so that it is a Herculean labor to pluck them.” 
Indeed, throughout the five-year Odyssey, there were the rare Eureka moments of discoveries, 
but more were nothing but blood, toil, tears and sweat. However, to pluck the celestial fruits, the 
golden apples of the Hesperides, no amount of blood, toil, tears and sweat spilled while battling a 
hundred-headed dragon can intimidate me.  
     I want to give my sincere gratitude to Prof. Ilya Cuypers who has guided me in this academic 
marathon about problems big and small from the very beginning of my PhD journey. My 
admiration for Prof. Heli Wang, whose prominent scholarship brought me to SMU, grew only 
stronger through my interaction with her. I truly appreciate her sharp insights, professional 
judgements, and patient advices. I am forever indebted to Prof. Mario Schijven, whose strategy 
class at Mays Business School changed my life forever and made me determined to be a strategy 
scholar. Whenever I begin to doubt myself, I can always find refuges from him across the 
oceans. I also would like to thank Prof. David Gomulya, who was my first connection to 
Singapore when I decided to pursue a career of scholarship in strategy. In a small world, it’s 
 ii 
 
truly my fortune to have him in my dissertation committee 5 years later. Beyond the committee 
members, I also would like to extend my appreciation to Prof. Simon Schillebeeckx who 
personally taught me how to clean patent data step by step and to Prof. Gokahn Ertug whose 
honest assessment may be blunt but highly conducive for my self-reflection. Last but certainly 
not the least, I would like to thank my family, especially my parents who always believe in me. 
     The conclusion of the PhD study represents nothing but a first milestone in my lifelong 
pursuit of truth. Although the path to knowledge discovery is winding and treacherous, every 
new discovery advances the frontier of current human knowledge. Greek philosopher Plato 
described a world in a cave, where the reality can only be observed from the shadows cast on the 
wall of the cave and the inhabitants are imprisoned by the chain of ignorance. Science forges 
such a torching sword that breaks the chains of ignorance, lights up the darkness, and leads us 
out of the cave into the real world bathed in the sunlight of knowledge and truth. Among all 
forms of human endeavors, science stands out with its adherence to demonstrable truth based on 
empirical observation. It is precisely for this very reason why science has always captivated me, 
from a curious child obsessed with dinosaurs and the universe to a young scholar exploring the 
unknowns of the business world. I cannot think of a nobler cause for a career other than growing 
the circle of knowledge for human civilization while eliminating ignorance and dogmas. If life 
craves for a purpose, I hope that I have found myself a worthy goal in the pursuit of scientific 
truth. 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
With over 44,000 deals and 4.5 trillion USD total transaction volumes in 2015 (JP Morgan, 
2017), acquisition has become one of the most popular strategic initiatives in firm’s strategic 
toolkit. However, acquisition does not always create value for acquirer (Haleblian, Devers, 
McNamara, Carpenter, and Davison, 2009). Meta-analysis result shows that on average 
acquisition even destroys shareholder value for the acquirer (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 
2004). Scholars have discovered a number of explanations that drive acquisition activities 
including market power (e.g. Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983), resource seeking (e.g. Capron, 
Dussauge, & Michell, 1998; Puranam and Srikanth, 2007), market for corporate control (e.g. 
Agrawal and Walkling, 1994; Jensen, 1986), resource dependency absorption (e.g. Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005), and market entry (e.g. Hennart, 1988; Hennart & Reddy, 1997), especially a 
variety of value destroying factors such as managerial self-interest in compensation (Agrawal & 
Walkling, 1994; Harford & Li, 2007) and managerial hubris (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2008) to name just a few (see Haleblian et al., 2009 for a review).    
In addition to the grim prospect of acquisition success, other outcomes of acquisition are also 
worth exploring. As a disruptive strategic event that affects broad stakeholders that may or may 
not have a say in the decision process, acquisition has significant intended or unintended 
consequences for various stakeholders associated with the deal. An acquisitive growth strategy 
may require the adjustment of compatible stakeholder strategy (Zollo, Minoja, & Coda, 2018) as 
acquisition often causes significant operation disruptions at both acquirer and target firm such as 
target employee layoffs (Fried, Tiegs, Naughton, & Ashforth, 1996; O’Shaughnessy & Flanagan, 
1998). These turnovers are not limited to ordinary employees as significant executive departures 
often occur during the target post-acquisition process for both the target (Cannella and 
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Hambrick, 1993; Walsh, 1988, 1989) and even the acquiring firm (Haveman, 1995). Because of 
the interplays between acquisition outcomes and potential motives, it is crucial to examine how 
these factors independently and interactively manifest in corporate acquisitions.  
In my dissertation, I look at two additional factors that may affect acquisition performance by 
conducting two empirical studies on the antecedents that motivate acquirer as well as 
consequences of acquisition from both acquirer and target’s perspectives. I build on existing 
management theories such as the Behavioral Theory of the Firm (BTF), performance feedback 
theory, and Resource Based View (RBV) to contribute to a better understanding of acquisition. 
More specifically, because acquisition is an agreement negotiated and reached by the executives 
from both acquirer and target, it is pivotal to examine how acquisition may affect their personal 
fortunes and subsequent behaviors. Hence, I focus on arguably the most important stakeholders 
in the acquisition process, the decision makers of both acquiring and target firms. 
To better understand why acquisition fails to deliver the expected success, it is essential to 
first account for what motivate acquisitions. In addition to the myriads of value creating and 
value destroying motives behind acquisition (Haleblian et al., 2009), because acquisition 
decision is often prone to behavioral bias (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986), firms may also pursue 
acquisitions for behavioral reasons following problemistic search (e.g., Iyer & Miller, 2008). At 
the same time, based on deal specific performance feedback, the consequence of acquisition may 
influence future acquisition decisions (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006; Kim, Finkelstein, 
& Haleblian, 2015). Acquirer senior managers are particularly susceptible to their wealth 
position and status shift in response to performance feedbacks and may respond with more risky 
decisions (Kumar, Dixit, & Francis, 2015). The first study delves into the motives behind 
acquisition by examining how performance feedbacks from corporate development activities 
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such as alliances and acquisitions may influence future acquisition decisions. Results indicate 
that following problemistic searches, both negative alliance and acquisition feedbacks trigger 
high rates of future acquisitions but not alliances. Furthermore, I also observe a negative 
interaction effect between negative alliance and acquisition feedbacks, suggesting that future 
acquisition decisions are dampened rather than fueled by combined negative acquisition and 
alliance feedbacks. This study enriches the existing literature on the antecedents of acquisitions 
while contributing to the performance feedback theory on the sequence of problemistic solution 
search. 
The second study examines how target firm’s resource structure may affect acquirer’s 
decision to retain target’s CEO. Because resource acquisition is the main motive behind many 
acquisition decisions (e.g., Kaul & Wu, 2016; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007), the decision to retain 
target CEO who is the chief officer of resource orchestration at the target firm often makes or 
breaks an acquisition (Graebner, 2004; Zollo & Singh, 2004). It is vital to understand how target 
firm’s resource base may affect acquirer’s decision to retain target’s CEO. This study examines 
the influence of target firm’s knowledge structure on target CEO retention decision. The results 
indicate that firm specific knowledge structure at the target firm is associated with higher 
likelihood of target CEO retention in the post-acquisition integration period. This relationship is 
strengthened by the target’s pre-acquisition performance, which signals a higher value of firm-
specific knowledge; and the target CEO’s tenure, which is positively associated with both the 
benefit of retaining and the cost of replacing the CEO. Phenomenologically, this study 
contributes to a better understanding of the determinants of target CEO retention decision in the 
post-acquisition executive retention process; theoretically, this paper extends the existing 
literature on firm-specific knowledge studies into the realm of inter-organizational studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 CLIMBING THE CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT LADDER: 
REVISITING PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK AND CORPORATE 
ACQUISITION BEHAVIORS 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Behavioral Theory of the Firm (BTF) and performance feedback theory have been used to 
explain corporate acquisition behaviors both at the organizational and deal levels. However, 
extant literature does not agree on the relationship between acquisition performance feedback 
and subsequent acquisition likelihood. Firms may search in different directions in response to 
acquisitions failures. Moreover, we still lack a clear understanding of the behavioral influences 
on the various sourcing mechanisms. To address these questions, we built on both the BTF and 
prospect theory to propose a search hierarchy among corporate sourcing methods. We posit that 
the general search direction in corporate development follows from internal to external, from 
simple to complex, and from economical to costly. We hypothesize that deal performance 
feedback is negatively related to future acquisitions as a result of problemistic search and risk 
taking. We further investigate the interaction between alliance and acquisition performance 
feedback on future acquisitions. Using a large sample of US public firms from different 
industries, we find our hypotheses supported.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Carnegie school of organizational decision-making system builds on the premise of the 
bounded rationality of decision makers who are ignorant of the distribution of solution costs and 
payoffs (Simon, 1947; March & Simon, 1958). The Behavioral Theory of the Firm (BTF) posits 
that negative performance feedback induces problemistic search to seek for potential solutions 
near problem symptom or current alternative to restore performance shortfall (Cyert & March, 
1963). Its offshoot, performance feedback theory, later augmented the risk-taking aspect to the 
problemistic search process (e.g., Bromiley, 1991; Chen & Miller, 2007; March & Shapira, 
1987; 1992; Greve, 1998; 2003). Performance below aspirations has been found to lead to 
increased risk-taking behaviors in its searches to restore attainment discrepancy (Fiegenbaum 
and Thomas, 1996; Greve, 2003; Singh, 1986; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). However, such risk 
takings are considered a byproduct of search while ignoring how risky solutions may affect the 
sequence of solution searches. What remains unclear is how increased risk-taking behaviors may 
influence the sequence of solution search. In this paper, we explicitly consider how risks entailed 
in resource investments of solution implementation may bias problemistic search. Acquisition 
represents the most expensive, complex, and time-consuming corporate development mechanism 
that involves significant risks (e.g., Capron & Mitchell, 2012; Kumar, Dixit, & Francis, 2015; 
Iyer & Miller, 2008). Acquisition decision is also particularly suitable to study this research 
question because it is often prone to behavioral biases (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). We intend to fill 
this research gap by examining how alliance and acquisition performance feedbacks, may affect 
search behaviors in corporate acquisitions. 
Under the BTF framework, boundedly rational managers may engage in ‘problemistic 
search’ by conducting a variety of organizational search behaviors including acquisitions when 
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firm financial performance falls below aspiration (Iyer & Miller, 2008; Shinkle, 2012). Firms 
may also turn to acquisitions for growth when organic growth has stalled (Kim, Haleblian, & 
Finkelstein, 2011). In parallel to the studies that focus on organizational performance feedback, 
some scholars have focused exclusively on the association between focal acquisition feedback 
and the likelihood of subsequent deal (e.g. Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006; Kim, 
Finkelstein, & Haleblian, 2015) and deal completion (e.g. Luo, 2005; Muehlfeld et al., 2012). 
Although some studies found a positive relationship between focal deal performance and 
subsequent acquisition likelihood among US commercial banks (Haleblian et al., 2006; Kim et 
al., 2015), a multi-industry study on recent IPO firms unexpectedly uncovered the opposite effect 
(Arikan & McGahan, 2010), yet other studies observed that poor acquisition performances may 
result in continual searches with minor adjustments such as choosing risky targets (Kumar, Dixit, 
& Francis, 2015) and paying lower premiums (Gong, Zhang, & Xia, 2017) in future acquisitions.  
Because strategic alliance and acquisition can fulfill similar goals, they are often viewed as 
substitutes by managers (Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2004). Many different rationales have been 
provided to analyze the choice between these two dominant external sourcing mechanisms (e.g. 
Villalonga & McGahan, 2005; Wang and Zajac, 2007; Yin and Shanley, 2008). Thanks to 
alliance’s flexibility and uncertainty avoidance characteristics (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; 
Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002), it often precedes an acquisition and serves as a real option in a 
series of staged equity investments (Folta & Miller, 2002; Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & 
Noorderhaven, 2002; Yang, Lin, & Peng, 2011). From the BTF perspective, while organizational 
overall performance shortfall (e.g.  Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Shipilov, Li, & 
Greve, 2011; Tyler & Caner, 2015) and positive alliance specific performance feedback have 
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been found to lead to increased alliance activities (Arikan & McGahan, 2010), little is known as 
to how alliance performance feedback may affect future acquisition decisions.          
A firm is simultaneously pulled by the opportunity prospects and pushed by its current 
organizational performance relative to aspirations in its decisions (Barreto, 2012; Chen, 2008). 
Unsatisfactory acquisition or alliance performance feedback not only indicate that the current 
method may be problematic (Haleblian et al., 2006) but also leave the current strategic objective 
unfulfilled. We propose a hierarchy of sourcing methods culminating at acquisitions enacted by 
firms when seeking opportunities or mitigating threats (Capron & Mitchell, 2012). We argue that 
negative alliance and acquisition performance feedback trigger more future acquisitions through 
‘problemistic search’ (Cyert & March, 1963). Alliance and acquisition failures also encourage 
risk takings such as more acquisitions to regain the losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
This study strives to make several contributions in our understanding of acquisition behaviors 
as well as performance feedback theory in general. First, this finding adds to the Behavior 
Theory of the Firm (BTF) by identifying solution implementation cost as an important 
contingency in the problemistic search process. Previous studies have considered how different 
degrees (e.g. Baum et al., 2005) and durations of performance shortfall (Joseph, Klingebiel, & 
Wilson, 2016; Shimizu, 2007) may affect subsequent search directions between ‘local search’ of 
existing solutions and ‘distant search’ of new ones (Levinthal, 1997). By incorporating the 
concept of risk taking when below aspiration (Bromiley, 1991; March & Shapira, 1987; 1992), 
we establish a hierarchy of solution searches based on the costs, complexity, and risks involved 
in the solutions. Unsatisfactory performance feedback prompts problemistic search of 
increasingly risky and costly solutions that require significant resource investments. Our work 
thus adds another dimension in the failure induced search prescriptions on top of the different 
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moderating factors such as firm size (Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 2011), search experience and 
legitimacy (Desai, 2008), approaching deadline (Lehman, Hahn, Ramanujam, & Alge, 2011), 
and momentum (Lehman & Hahn, 2013) on risky problemistic searches in the extant literature. 
When a complex solution fails, the problemistic search process is more likely to occur within the 
current solution through continuous fine-tuning than reverting to a simpler solution.  
Second, this paper establishes a hierarchy in the ‘search’ sequence of organizational sourcing 
mechanisms. Given the enormous complexities and risks involved (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986), 
acquisition is deemed to be the last resort after other alternatives have failed (Capron & Mitchell, 
2012). Phenomenologically, building on the foundations of prior findings (e.g. Haleblian et al., 
2006; Iyer & Miller, 2008; Kim et al., 2015; Arikan & McGahan, 2010), this study broadens our 
understanding of the behavioral antecedents in corporate acquisitions. 
      Lastly, our paper serves as the first attempt of its kind to study the interactions of 
performance feedback from two substitutive strategic initiatives. Whereas past studies have 
examined the effects of competing goals and sequential attentions (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 
2008), no study has looked at how performance feedback from two potential solutions may affect 
new search patterns. Answering the call from Shinkle (2012), we study the interplays between 
capabilities and performance feedback as well as their influences on the directions of search.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Problemistic Search and Risk Taking 
 
     A central theme of the BTF lies in problemistic search triggered when performance falls 
below aspiration (Cyert & March, 1963). Decision makers lack the full knowledge of the perfect 
solution and therefore must resort to problemistic searches in order to restore performance 
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shortfalls (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1947). In addition, bounded rationality also assumes 
that decision makers are largely unaware of the cost-efficiency of a given solution (Simon, 
1957). Simple minded search follows a set of standard operating procedures (Cyert & March, 
1963) or routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) that start searches within “the neighborhood of the 
current symptom...and the neighborhood of the current alternative” (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 
170). Unsatisfactory search results trigger failure induced searches in increasingly distant areas 
through long-jumps (Billinger, Stieglitz, & Schumacher, 2014; Levinthal, 1997). Local and 
distant searches have been linked to exploitation-exploration learning (Gavetti & Levinthal, 
2000; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006). Exploratory searches are deemed inherently risky as they 
represent unknown distribution of outputs (Baum et al., 2005; March, 1991; March & Shapira, 
1992; Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010). Parallel to problemistic search, drawing from prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), performance feedback theory also developed a series of 
predictions on organizational risk takings accompanying organizational changes (Bromiley, 
1991; Chen & Miller, 2007; March & Shapira, 1987; 1992). In general, in accordance with the 
predictions from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), organizational changes that 
entail significant risks are activated when performance falls below aspirational levels in the loss 
frame (Greve, 1998; Lehman & Hahn, 2013; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). 
Risks can be understood as the variations of the potential distributions of outcomes (March & 
Shapira, 1987; 1992; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). However, risk taking is often implied by the 
degree to which decision makers are willing to put resources at stake (Lehman et al., 2011; 
Lehman & Hahn, 2013) and measured by the size of bet (Boyle & Shapira, 2012), capacity 
expansion (Audia & Greve, 2006; Desai, 2008; Greve, 2011), and acquisitions (Iyer & Miller, 
2008). For example, a bet of $10,000 involves more risk takings than a bet of $100 for the same 
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level of risk. Therefore, a potential solution can entail significant risk taking not because it has 
high variations of outcome distributions but because it requires significant resource investments.             
     Because most local and distant search studies are conducted with simulation and lab 
experiments using the NK or bandit search model (e.g., Billinger et al., 2014; Denrell & March, 
2001; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997), the costs of solution implementation as well 
as the risks of failures are assumed away. Cost concern for solution implementation, 
nevertheless, permeates every decision in our daily lives1. A potential solution that may be able 
to address a problem behind may not be searched at first due to concerns for significant resource 
investment. Following the call by Posen, Keil, Kim, and Meissner (2018), we relax the 
somewhat unrealistic assumption of completely blind trial and error search in the traditional BTF 
model (Cyert & March, 1963) and argue that decision makers have a basic awareness on the 
costs of various potential solutions.2 This perspective is well grounded in empirical observations 
of risk-taking behaviors in experiments based on the money at stake (Boyle & Shapira, 2012; 
MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). It has also been implicitly 
assumed in various problemistic search studies that use resource investments as a proxy for risk 
taking (Audia & Greve, 2006; Chen & Miller, 2007; Desai, 2008).3 The unrealistic assumption of 
“a high degree of automaticity in firms’ response to performance feedback and an overly 
                                                          
1 For instance, it is very effective for police to use the SWAT team against an armless robber, but in view of the costs of 
deploying the SWAT team, it’s not very efficient to use the nuclear weapon in the law enforcement arsenal. Similarly, when there 
is a bed bug or roach problem at home, though pest control is often very effective in handling these problems, it may be too 
expensive to call them for a minor problem. Instead, a minor less costly approach such as DIY spraying may be applied first 
before trying the ultimate solution. 
2 It is important to note that we do not claim that decision makers are fully rational homo economicus as portrayed in the classic 
economics. Rather, in resemblance to the psychic distance used in international business to measure perceived international 
distances between the host country and home country (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), we argue that decision makers would 
perceive certain solutions to be costlier than others. They may not correspond perfectly to reality. For instance, acquisition is 
perceived costlier than alliance in general, even though, a focused acquisition is much cheaper and less risky than an open-ended 
alliance (Capron & Mitchell, 2012). 
3 The costs under discussion may not be limited to financial costs, and may take the form of opportunity cost, adjustment cost, 
and sunk cost through format change (Greve, 1998), routines change (Massini, Lewin, & Greve, 2005), and changes in distant 
formation (Baum et al., 2005). 
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routinized process search” in the original traditional conceptualization of problemistic search 
model also came under fire recently (Posen et al., 2018, p. 54). With the premise of absolute 
bounded rationality relaxed, decision makers are endowed with certain cognitive ability in 
choosing potential solutions “offline” based on their mental models (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; 
Posen et al., 2018) with an eye on the potential costs of solution implementation before “online 
search”. Most empirical studies assume attainment discrepancy automatically triggers 
organizational changes to restore performance shortfall, while this process is mediated by many 
intermediate steps in the problemistic solution searches, a black box in the existing literature. 
The performance feedback theory, nevertheless, explicitly separates solutions generated through 
problemistic search and the subsequent organizational change as not all potential solutions 
generated through problemistic search are to be implemented (Greve, 2003). More specifically, it 
further inserts risk taking to bridge these two processes by stating that:  
Proposals to change the organization are evaluated for their costs and benefits, and risk is 
central in this consideration. 
Whether a solution will be implemented and what kind of solution will be chosen 
depends on the risk preferences of the decision makers, making risk theory an important 
component of the theory of organizational reactions to performance feedback. Risk 
theory predicts that risk preferences change in response to performance feedback. Risky 
alternatives are more acceptable when the decision maker is in the loss domain, so 
performance below the aspiration level should make major organizational changes more 
acceptable to managers. (Greve, 2003, p. 57). 
Risk taking not only may manifest through increased resource investment in existing solutions 
such as capacity expansion (e.g., Audia & Greve, 2006; Desai, 2008;) but also through selection 
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of solutions that demand resource investments. Absent from concerns of survival risk (March & 
Shapira, 1987; 1992)4, risky solutions that demand significant resource investments are more 
likely to be chosen in a loss frame to win back the losses incurred in the past (Bromiley, 1991; 
Greve, 1998; Iyer & Miller, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). As discussed previously, in this 
paper, risk taking is defined as the degree to which resource invested in solution implementation. 
Different Hierarchies of Search 
     The problemistic search starts in the neighborhood of problem symptom or previously 
adopted actions and expands into increasingly distant areas (Cyert & March, 1963). In other 
words, there is a hierarchy of problemistic search process that favors local exploitative search 
over distant exploratory search (Billinger et al., 2014; Helfat, 1994; Levinthal, 1997; March, 
1991). A hierarchy of problemistic search suggests that high level of solutions (e.g., distant 
search) are unlikely to be tried until the lower level alternatives (e.g., local search) have been 
exhausted. Failures from high level solutions (e.g., distant search) are unlikely to be followed by 
lower level solutions (e.g., local search). We posit that there exists another dimension of search 
hierarchy that ranks potential solutions based on their perceived costs, complexities, and risks of 
execution. Problemistic search commences with lower cost solutions and spirals upwards 
towards costlier solutions that demand significant resource investments. Significant performance 
shortfall may trigger corresponding risk takings that involve drastic increases of resources 
investments (Audia & Greve, 2006; Chen & Miller, 2007; Desai, 2008; Greve, 2011) while 
bypassing the rather moderate incremental steps. This hierarchy adds the concept of solution 
implementation costs missing in the original conceptualization in the BTF.5  
                                                          
4 It is precisely for the risks of increased resource investments do firms become risk averse when firm survival is at stake. 
5 For example, when a person falls sick, there are a variety of potential solutions to choose from. Depending on the 
severity and duration of the symptom, the patient may start by resting, then taking some aspirin available at home or 
nearby pharmacy, before making doctor appointments for diagnosis or even getting hospitalized for treatment. Some 
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------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Graph 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
     Similarly, we argue that a similar pattern can be found in the organizational problemistic 
search process, in which less costly solutions are tried before more radical ones (Joseph et al., 
2016; Shimizu, 2007). Escalation of commitments favors increased resource investments in 
expensive potential solutions (Staw & Hoang, 1995). Because decision makers are prone to take 
more risks when performance falls below aspiration, they are more likely to choose risker 
solutions in response to failures of their recent solution search to “win back the stakes lost” 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). In addition, decision makers whose 
prior actions fail to restore performance are reluctant to withdraw commitments to restore 
performance (Staw, 1976, 1981, 1997). Personal concerns such as loss of personal status 
prevents decision makers from admitting defeat and reversing course (Hayward & Shimizu, 
2006; McNamara, Moon, & Bromiley, 2002).  
Search Hierarchy in Corporate Development Activities 
     The distance between a firm’s current capability level and the desired level forms a resource 
gap that it needs to bridge (Capron & Mitchell, 2009). A firm may choose to close the gap 
through a combination of internal and external sourcing mechanisms. We argue that when an 
organization seeks to search for external solutions to meet a strategic goal, the search process 
follows a hierarchy, in which borrowing through alliances (including basic contracting, strategic 
agreements, and JVs) is preferred over buying through acquisitions (Capron & Mitchell, 2012). 
                                                          
potential solutions are not necessarily more local or distant but costlier than others. A hospital visit always trumps 
taking aspiring available at home in its effectiveness in treating most illnesses, but it’s by no means a more efficient 
solution, considering the financial costs, waiting time, and troubles involved. As a cheaper solution, aspiring may be 
able to solve the problem without going to the hospital. This hierarchy of search also does not spiral downwards 
from failed hospitalization to taking aspirin or resting at home.         
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External sourcing mechanisms fall on a continuous spectrum in terms of organizing mechanism 
from simple to complex, relationship length from transient to permanent, control intensity from 
loose to tight, and risk from low to high (Leonard, 1995). Basic contracting such as a licensing 
agreement is often considered first during external searches thanks to its relative simplicity and 
affordability. Because of the satisficing principle (March & Simon, 1958), search process ceases 
whenever the first acceptable alternative presents itself (Cyert & March, 1963). Compared with 
strategic alliances and acquisitions, basic contracting is much less costly, risky and uncertain. As 
a telecom executive stated in an interview with Capron and Mitchell (2012), “whenever possible, 
go for the cheapest way: the basic contract or the one-shot transaction” before turning to more 
complicated options (p. 70). In the event of failed contracting attempts, a firm may search for 
alternatives using more complex methods such as acquisitions. Because of its enormous 
complexity, risks, and costs, acquisition is reserved as the last resort after all other options have 
failed (Capron & Mitchell, 2012).6 As an executive put it in Capron and Mitchell’s (2012) study 
about their grueling trial-and-error search process from build to borrow to buy, “each failure 
revealed more of this pattern: that we needed to reach a certain threshold of competency before 
we could run effective internal development or be an effective partner within an alliance. We had 
to finally turn to acquisitions to accelerate R&D” (p. 21).        
     It is important to note that a hierarchy of problemistic search for firm sourcing methods does 
not profess that every firm religiously climbs the hierarchical search ladder step by step to reach 
acquisition at the top. Instead, many firms may jump to acquisitions to obtain desired resources 
once internal development appears insufficient (Capron & Mitchell, 2012). The BTF also 
                                                          
6 For instance, IBM began its efforts to enter into the telecommunication market with failed internal development. It then turned 
to partnering with Mitel Corp and Rolm before finally spending $1.5 billion to acquire Rolm (Schrage, 1984). 
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suggests that ‘problemistic search’ follows standard operating procedures and turn to existing 
solutions (Cyert & March, 1963; Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). 7 In the event of emergency or 
significant performance decline, a decision maker may forego the middle steps and resort to the 
most expensive solution. In the search hierarchy model proposed here, a firm does not start its 
search process from complex risky acquisitions and then turns to simpler solutions such as basic 
contracting when those acquisitions fail. Rather, as prescribed in the BTF (Cyert and March, 
1963), the search hierarchy in strategic sourcing presents a general direction of search from local 
to distant, from internal to external, and from simple to complex. In this study, we focus 
exclusively on the performance feedback and search process of two complex external sourcing 
mechanisms, alliances and acquisitions. Given the important roles that they play in implementing 
corporate strategy and achieving growth, their choices have been studied extensively in prior 
literature (e.g. Arikan & McGahan, 2010; Dyer et al., 2004; Shi et al., 2011; Villalonga and 
McGahan, 2005; Wang and Zajac, 2007; Yang et al., 2011).   
Deal Specific Performance Feedback 
     Feedback valency, the dichotomy between success and failure is central to the BTF and 
performance feedback theory (Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012; Greve, 2003; March & 
Simon, 1958). Positive performance feedback leads to satisficing behaviors, whereas negative 
one triggers ‘problemistic search’ (Cyert & March, 1963). The BTF also emphasizes on 
uncertainty avoidance and thus prefers immediate quantifiable results in its feedback 
mechanisms that can be attributed to a specific action (Cyert & March, 1963). Stock market 
                                                          
7 Indeed, 40% of surveyed telecom firms in Capron and Mitchell’s (2012) study “relied heavily on one main way of growing” 
and added just one additional pathway such as M&A to complement its internal development (p. 22). In other situations, a firm 
may consider a sourcing option without implementing it before choosing the more sophisticated alternative. When Wal-Mart 
decided to expand in Africa in 2011, after multiple failed attempts of greenfield ventures and careful deliberation of alliances, it 
jumped to acquiring South African retailer Massmart directly (Capron & Mitchell, 2012, p. 147).  
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reactions to deal announcements constitute such swift simplistic performance feedback. Natural 
aspiration that separates gains and losses by zero is ‘cognitively simple to process’ … ‘capable 
of evoking strong reactions’ (Greve, 2003, p. 40). Numerous studies have demonstrated that 
firms are attentive to market reactions by adjusting their subsequent behaviors such as routine 
repetitions (Arikan & McGahan, 2010; Haleblian et al., 2006), deal terminations (Luo, 2005), 
and risk takings (Kumar et al., 2015). Decision makers pay special attention to market reactions 
as their wealth positions and job security are affected (Kumar et al., 2015). Moreover, strategic 
decisions such as acquisitions and alliances are not made in isolation but come in a sequence of 
related decisions (Gong et al., 2017; Kumar et al., 2015). When making a series of related 
complex decisions, decision makers integrate gains or losses from previous outcomes (Thaler & 
Johnson, 1990). Hence, we examine deal specific performance feedback comprehensively. 
      It is also argued that “managers are more likely to favor changes that are large financially but 
not organizationally” such as “acquisition of other organizations” that serve as “very attractive 
solutions for managers who seek financial risk but not organizational risk” (Greve, 2003, p. 58). 
Therefore, it is very appropriate to use deal specific performance feedback to test performance 
feedback searches based on future acquisition activities.  
Alliance Performance Feedback and Future Acquisitions 
Alliances can be defined as “any voluntarily initiated cooperative agreement between firms 
that involve exchange, sharing, or co-development, and it can include contributions by partners 
of capital, technology, or firm-specific assets” (Gulati & Singh, 1998, p. 781). Alliances include 
arm’s length transactions such as licensing, long-term strategic partnerships, and JVs (Capron & 
Mitchell, 2009). It differs from acquisition in that alliance partners share resources, knowledge, 
and controls to achieve a common goal while remaining independent entities. A flurry of studies 
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has examined the choice between acquisition and alliance from different angles (e.g. Dyer et al., 
2004; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005; Wang & Zajac, 2007; Yin & 
Shanley, 2008). From the performance feedback perspective, alliances or acquisitions are found 
to be preceded by strong prior performances of the same deal types (Arikan & McGahan, 2010; 
Haleblian et al., 2006). Weak performances, however, may trigger ‘problemistic search’ (Cyert 
& March, 1963; Greve, 2003). Surveys among executives show that alliances are reflexively 
avoided after recent failures (Capron & Mitchell, 2012; Dyer et al., 2004).  
Partner opportunistic behaviors and rising coordination costs represent two major problems 
that may arise in alliances (Yin & Shanley, 2008). The BTF prescribes that negative performance 
feedback may lead to problemistic search of potential solutions (Cyert & March, 1963). Local 
search would reveal takeover of the JV or alliance partner(s) as a viable option. Furthermore, 
managers tend to escalate commitments to an unsuccessful decision (Shimizu, 2007; Staw, 1976; 
1981), especially when they are responsible for them (Staw & Ross, 1987). Research shows that 
two thirds of alliances exhibit serious problems within two years (Bleeke & Ernst, 1995) and 
40% of alliances are terminated within four years, mostly through takeover by one partner 
(Harrigan, 1988).8 Hence, acquisition is often searched as a feasible solution in problematic 
alliances. Unsuccessful local search often results in distant search in remote areas (Baum et al., 
2005; Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal, 1997). This may happen when it’s unfeasible to acquire 
alliance partner(s). To accomplish the intended strategic objectives, firms may search for new 
alternatives in distant areas through new acquisition. Further, as prescribed in the BTF (Cyert & 
March, 1963), performance feedback provides a second-order opportunity, through which 
                                                          
8 For example, Merril Lynch and HSBC initially set up a JV in 2000 intended to provide online banking services globally. Fed up 
with mounting coordination costs, HSBC eventually internalized the venture two years later (Capron & Mitchell, 2012, p. 111). 
In as similar case, only one year after having formed an alliance with Rolm, wary of rising tension with the partner, IBM moved 
to acquire it with $1.5 billion to gain total control (Schrage, 1984). 
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routines and strategies associated with failures are discarded and replaced with alternative ones 
(e.g. Greve, 1998; Lant & Mezias, 1992; Levitt & March, 1988). Regardless of the underlying 
mechanism, failures in alliance may prompt managers to reevaluate their external sourcing 
strategy and choose acquisition as an alternative (Dyer et al., 2004).9  
Prospect theory at the individual level as well as performance reference point theory at the 
organizational level suggest that decision makers are risk averse when their previous decisions 
produce gains but become risk seeking in subsequent decisions when they suffered losses in 
related prior decisions (e.g. Bromiley, 1991; Feigenbaum, Hart, & Schendel, 1996; Greve, 2003; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). Since acquisitions require 
irreversible resource commitments (Folta, 1998; Folta & Miller, 2002) and often fall victim to 
adverse selection due to information asymmetry (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993), in comparison to 
alliances, they are inherently riskier (Dyer et al., 2004). 10 Acquisition is considered the most 
complex, risky, and costly solution only to be enacted after all other solutions have been 
exhausted (Capron & Mitchell, 2012).11 However, despite being risker, acquisition is viewed 
more favorably by investors in value creation than alliances during firm turnaround (Morrow, 
Sirmon, Hitt, & Holcomb, 2007). In the problemistic search process following negative 
responses in alliances, in view of the potential upsides of acquisition, decision makers are likely 
to take risks by attempting more acquisitions.  
                                                          
9 For instance, after Coca-Cola announced its proposed JV with P&G to facilitate R&D and distribution of juice, a strategy to 
diversify away from the stagnant carbonated drinks, its stock dropped over 6% as investors worried that the terms are unfavorable 
to Coke. Under pressure, Coca-Cola decided to withdraw from the deal a few months later and relied on a series of new 
acquisitions to build up its presence in the new market sector (Barnes & Winter, 2001). 
10 Alliance and JV are subject to knowledge leakage and appropriation risks (e.g. Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998). However, this 
type of risk is fundamentally different from the financial risk of resource investments considered under the prospect theory.  
11 Acquisition does not have a higher likelihood of failure than alliance per se, but it involves more risking taking as it requires 
more resource investment and have much more to lose. 
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To sum up, alliance failures reveal inadequacy in the current approach, leading to either local 
search within the current deal structure or distant search of new deals. The performance feedback 
literature suggests that failure with the current approach prompts searches for novel alternatives, 
whereas success biases against such changes (Denrell & March, 2001; Posen & Levinthal 
2012).12 As discussed previously, whereas success breeds persistency (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 
2000; Lant & Mezias, 1992; Miller & Chen, 1994), failure induces reorientation and exploration 
of alternative routines and strategies (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998; Lant, Milliken, & 
Batra, 1992). Furthermore, decision makers are likely to be more risk seeking and search for 
risky solutions such as acquisition in reaction to negative performance feedbacks (Bromiley, 
1991; Greve, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). While new alliances may serve as potential 
solutions, given the recent alliance failures and the fundamental flaws within alliance deal 
structure, decision makers are likely to search upwards for more complex and risky alternatives 
such as acquisitions that provide solutions to these problems. Such failure induced search may 
lead to strong bias against past unsuccessful routines independent of the merits (Denrell & 
March, 2001). Survey results indeed show that alliances are reflexively avoided after recent 
failures due to superstitious learning (Capron & Mitchell, 2012). Therefore, either through local 
search that takes over alliance partner(s) within the current deal or distant search with a new 
target, firms are likely to conduct more acquisitions following negative alliance feedbacks.  
Hypothesis 1:  Recent negative alliance performance feedbacks are associated with higher rate 
of acquisitions in the future.  
 
                                                          
12 Indeed, existing literature suggests that renewed cooperation is preceded by favorable outcomes of previous deals (Arikan & 
McGahn, 2010; Schwab & Miner, 2008). 
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Acquisition Performance Feedback and Future Acquisitions 
As discussed previously, whereas success breeds persistency (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; 
Lant & Mezias, 1992; Miller & Chen, 1994), failure induces reorientation and exploration of 
alternative routines and strategies (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 
1992). Such failure induced search may lead to strong bias against past unsuccessful routines 
(Denrell & March, 2001), while persistent successes may lead to myopia of learning (Levinthal 
& March, 1993; Levinthal, 1997). Although acquisitions and alliances share many task 
similarities such as partner/target selection, negotiation, and value appropriation (Chi, 2000), 
there are some stark disparities between them as acquisitions pay special attention to due 
diligence (Zollo and Reuer, 2010), valuations (Laamanen, 2007), and especially post-acquisition 
integration as well as target human capital retention (Wulf & Singh, 2011; Zollo & Singh, 2004). 
Acquisition failures may push firms away from using acquisitions in future external sourcing 
choices and towards alliances as an alternative (Dyer et al., 2004). Based on the failure induced 
search argument (Billinger et al., 2014; Levinthal, 1997; Denrell & March, 2001), acquisition 
failure should lead to increasing search in alternative sourcing methods. 
On the other hand, capabilities are developed through repeated occurrences of similar events 
(Levitt & March, 1988). “Capability development comes close to a chain of reactions triggered 
by an initial event, thereby establishing a capability trajectory. Capability development takes 
time and the speciﬁc way in which time has been taken (i.e., the intensity, frequency, and the 
duration of social interactions) is relevant for the gestalt of a capability” (Schreyögg and 
Kliesch-Eberl, 2007, p. 916). Indeed, based on a sample of US commercial banks, acquisition 
specific performance feedback is found to be positively related to the likelihood of subsequent 
acquisition (Haleblian et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2015). Continuous successful executions of deals 
of the same type may further cement future capability development trajectory (Dyer et al., 2004). 
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As positive investor response can be perceived as endorsement or existence of existing 
capability, firms are likely to continue to pursue future acquisitions following positive 
performance feedback (Arikan & McGahn, 2010) 
Hypothesis 2a:  Recent positive acquisition performance feedbacks are associated with high 
rate of acquisitions in the future. 
Viewed as “pieces of clay that firms attempt to mold” (Karim, 2006, p. 804), acquisition, 
together with other sourcing method, aims to achieve an overarching strategic goal (Ansoff, 
1979). A single acquisition usually only occupies one piece of the puzzle in an acquisition 
program (Barkema & Schijven, 2008).1314 As a last resort, acquisition should only be used after 
all other mechanisms have failed or deemed inappropriate or unfeasible (Capron & Mitchell, 
2012). While it is true that negative acquisition feedback may lead to problemistic search 
(Haleblian et al., 2006), BTF posits that search begins locally at the problem symptoms and 
current solutions (Cyert & March, 1963). In response to recent acquisition failures, in the spirit 
of ‘problemistic search’, instead of experimenting with a new sourcing strategy, a firm may learn 
from them, search locally, and adjust correspondingly, including paying lower premium (Gong et 
al., 2017), developing acquisition capability (Arikan & McGahan, 2010), choosing different 
potential targets (Kumar et al., 2015), designing more complex deal structure (Capron & 
Mitchell, 2012, p. 146), and even hiring external advisers (Kim et al., 2011).15 Unsuccessful local 
search drives firm to “increasingly complex search” (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 170). Risk seeking 
                                                          
13 For instance, guided by its “overarching strategy to diversify into the downstream value chain of film production”, 
entertainment company mm2 Asia decided to acquire Cathay Cineplexes' Singapore cinema operations following its unsuccessful 
Golden Village bid (Wong, 2017). 
14 It is conceivable that continuous failed acquisitions may lead to threat rigidity or readjustment of strategy, depending on the 
opportunity availability, external environment, and firm’s overall financial wellbeing. In this paper, we control for survival risk 
using Altman’s Z.  
15 For example, following a $37 billion failed merger with Aetna, insurance giant Humana decided to hire an acquisition 
specialist (Singer, 2017). 
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behaviors when framed as loss “may lead to sharp increases” of “the risk of the chosen 
alternative” (Greve, 2003, p .57). Because acquisition is perceived as the most costly and risky 
choice (Capron & Mitchell, 2012), it serves as a perfect candidate that fits the profile of a risky 
chosen alternative. 
Because negative acquisition performance feedback may lead to deal termination (Kau, 
Linck, & Rubin., 2008; Luo, 2005), it may leave a void that needs to be filled by the firm 
through additional deals since acquisition is usually taken after other options have been 
exhausted (Capron & Mitchell, 2012). In other cases, in view of hefty cancellation costs and 
escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976; 1981), acquirer may ignore the negative market signal 
and persist in its current endeavor. Sometimes, this persistency and arrogance can doom an 
acquisition.16 On the other hand, successful acquisition not only satisfies the expected strategic 
need but also requires extensive integration and restructuring to fully unleash the potential 
synergies (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Larsson & Finkelstein, 
1999). However, acquisition integration is extremely complex and time consuming (Graebner, 
Heimeriks, Huy, & Vaara, 2016). Acquisition of nested targets (Zorn, Sexton, Bhussar, & 
Lamont, 2017) and high acquisition rate (Laamanen & Keil, 2008) are detrimental to firm 
performance. Integrating acquisition targets hence consumes a huge chunk of managerial 
capacity that may be used in new acquisitions (Penrose, 1959).  
Acquisition embodies a complex strategic decision associated with significant risks (Kumar 
et al., 2015). Limited by their bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958), managers are often 
subject to behavioral bias in their acquisition decisions (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Beyond the 
                                                          
16 When Quaker announced its bid for Snapple for $1.7 billion, the news sent its stock down by almost 10% (Collins, 1994). 
Having ignored the warning from investors, Quaker persisted with the deal and ended up selling Snapple for a mere $300 million 
three years later (Feder, 1997). 
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general negative relationship between performance feedback and risk-taking behaviors laid out 
in the previous section, negative acquisition feedbacks have a unique influence on subsequent 
acquisition decisions. Escalation of commitments are particularly pertinent to risk seeking 
behaviors when negative feedback is “framed as a loss” (Greve, 2003, p. 27). Managers 
responsible for past decisions are likely to escalate commitments in the current strategy (Staw & 
Ross, 1987). Choosing between a certainty of loss and a chance to recover these losses with more 
investments, decision makers tend to choose the latter (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Beyond a 
risk-based understanding of escalation of commitments, individuals who feel responsible for 
their decision are likely to escalate further commitments to justify past failures (e.g., Staw & 
Ross, 1987), especially among individuals with high self-esteem (Sandelands, Brockner, and 
Glynn, 1988). Compared to incumbent CEO, a new CEO is more willing to reverse the past 
commitments and divest poorly performing acquired units (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006; Feldman, 
2014). Poor acquisition performances are particularly damaging to acquirer and its entire senior 
management team’s reputation and wealth position (Kumar et al., 2015). What’s more, research 
has shown that CEO responsible for recent bad acquisitions is more likely to be dismissed by the 
board (Lehn & Zhao, 2006). Similarly, an earlier study found that acquirers that have made 
value-destroying deals are vulnerable to market for corporate control takeover (Mitchell & Lehn, 
1990). A major reason why acquisitions are value destructive can be found in managerial self-
interest (Haleblian et al., 2009). Whilst CEOs tend to be risk averse to protect their personal 
wealth against potential losses, they become risk seeking when faced with high compensation 
variability and employment risk (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
In addition to the reasons for risk taking as predicted by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
 24 
 
1979), acquirer’s managers have strong self-interest to reverse the losses that have accumulated 
in pervious deals by taking more risky acquisitions (Kumar et al., 2015). 
To recover the loss positions and regain the reputation lost in prior acquisitions failures, the 
acquirer’s senior management team may resort to more risk-taking activities such as new 
acquisitions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kumar et al., 2015; Lehn & Zhao, 2006). Situated at 
the peak of the corporate development hierarchy, unsatisfactory acquisitions are unlikely to lead 
to searches downwards for lower level solutions that are less complex and risky, with reduced 
resource investments. Therefore, prior acquisition failures may result in increased risk takings by 
the means of acquisitions of risky targets (Kumar et al., 2015). Together with other factors, 
acquisition failure thus may lead to increased risk takings with more acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 2b:  Recent negative acquisition performance feedbacks are associated with high 
rate of acquisitions in the future. 17 
Several studies have found a multiplier effect when considering multiple goals 
simultaneously. Chen and Miller (2007) discover that firms can attend to multiple goals at the 
same time. In another example, when an investment’s performance feedbacks fall below both 
social and historical aspirations, the tendency to search no-local partners are amplified because 
the “combination of social and historical performance feedback creates a double threat’ that 
exceeds the intensity of ‘either feedback type would if considered alone.” (Baum et al., 2005, p. 
543). This may especially be the case when a potential action may serve as the solutions for 
different performance shortfalls. For instance, when a firm suffers from attainment discrepancies 
in both product qualities and revenues, it’s more likely to seek resources with both high status 
                                                          
17 An implicit precondition for a search hierarchy suggests that negative performance feedback from the most complex, costly, 
and riskiest solution (acquisition) does not lead to increased search activities in potential solutions situated at the lower level of 
the hierarchy. However, given the philosophical difficulty to test a non-effect using the scientific method, we do not explicitly 
hypothesize it, but still test it empirically nonetheless in the robustness check. 
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and reputation to close the gaps on both performance shortfalls (Ertug & Castellucci, 2013). 
Similarly, it was hypothesized that insurance firms might attend to firm size attainment 
discrepancy more when its financial performance falls below aspiration, because an efficient 
scale may be necessary for better financial performance (Greve, 2008). While alliance and 
acquisition feedback do not necessarily represent two different goals, since acquisition can serve 
as solutions for both alliance and acquisition failures, it is reasonable to believe that combined 
intensity of ‘problemistic search’ may lead to increased acquisitions.  
Hypothesis 3a:  The negative association between a firm’s recent alliance performance 
feedbacks and its future acquisition behaviors is amplified by its negative acquisition 
performance feedbacks.  
Contrary to the multiplier-effect, the BTF posits the sequential attention view that suggests 
organizations meet multiple aspirations one goal at a time (Cyert & March, 1963; Ocasio, 1997). 
For instance, when a firm fails to meet its profitability goal, it pays less attention to its size goal 
(Greve, 2008). However, alliance and acquisition performance feedback do not necessarily 
reflect two separate goals, but rather two separate sourcing mechanisms. Though there is little 
justification to prioritize one mechanism over the other, there are still several reasons why the 
negative relationship between alliance performance feedbacks and future acquisitions may be 
strengthened by positive acquisition performance feedbacks. 
First, as discussed in the first hypothesis, when alliances are punished by the market, a firm 
engages in ‘problemistic search’. Positive acquisition performance feedback conveys a strong 
signal of acquisition capability or even its mere perception, whereas negative alliance 
performance feedback signals the lack thereof (Arikan & McGahan, 2010). Acquisition 
capability can be defined as acquirer’s competence in performing a series of key acquisition 
activities including target identification, due diligence, negotiation, and post-acquisition 
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integration (e.g. Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Although alliance 
capability may be developed concurrently with acquisition capability (Bingham, Heimeriks, 
Schijven, & Gates, 2015), they entail some dissimilar tasks (Arikan & McGahan, 2010). 
Superficial experience spillover may lead to damaging outcomes (Zollo & Reuer, 2010). Strong 
acquisition capability can overcome many challenges and enable acquirers to pursue a broad 
range of difficult targets (Kaul & Wu, 2016). Ansoff (1979) also emphasized that aggressiveness 
of strategy is contingent upon organization’s capability. Firm equipped with strong acquisition 
capability thus can serve as a more viable alternative to alliance. Further, within the tradition of 
Carnegie School, the search process resembles the mating process in the garbage can model, in 
which existing solutions look for problems (Cohen et al., 1972). Because acquisition is viewed as 
a substitute for alliance (Dyer et al., 2004), positive recent acquisition feedback signal that it may 
serve as a potential solution for failed alliances in fulfilling their strategic objectives. On the flip 
side, if both alliances and acquisitions receive strong backlashes from shareholders, this may be 
perceived as a repudiation of its overall growth strategy through external sourcing. It may also 
leave the firm disoriented and rigid when facing threats.  
Second, another essential concept introduced in the BTF is politics and coalitions with 
divergent interests and goals (Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012;). Although alliances 
can be sensitive to organizational aspirations (e.g. Baum et al., 2005; Shipilov et al., 2011; Tyler 
and Caner, 2015), many of them are not made at the top level (e.g. Dyer et al., 2004; Gavetti et 
al., 2012). Acquisition, however, often represents a strategy decision made at the top 
management team (TMT) level and is subject to approval by the board (e.g. Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997; Nadolska & Barkema, 2014). Acquisitions and alliances hence are executed by 
different organizational coalitions. When alliances receive negative performance feedback while 
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comparable acquisition decisions are celebrated by the market, the power balance between 
acquisition and alliance functions shift in favor of future acquisitions.        
Third, instead of a reflection of acquirer’s acquisition capability, positive acquisition 
feedback may mirror optimistic market sentiment (Gaur, Malhortra, & Zhu, 2013), the dawn of 
an industry merger wave (McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008), or even superficial 
institutional endorsements (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). These external 
factors may send strong signals of validation to acquirers and encourage them to conduct more 
acquisitions in leu of alliances in future corporate initiatives. Consequently, acquisition units 
may gain an upper hand in future strategic decision power struggles (Greve & Zhang, 2016).  
Hypothesis 3b:  The negative association between a firm’s recent alliance performance 
feedbacks and its future acquisition behaviors is amplified by its positive acquisition 
performance feedbacks. 
 
METHODS 
Data and sample 
     We rely on a multi-industry US public firms sample between 1998 and 2014 to test our 
hypotheses. Multi-industry sample has been used previously in the study of alliance and 
acquisition performance feedback (Arikan & McGahan, 2010). In comparison to single industry 
studies, its results are less likely to be subject to unique industry characteristics and therefore are 
more generalizable. It is particularly suitable to study generic theories such as the behavioral 
theory of the firm and performance feedback (e.g. Iyer & Miller, 2008).  
     Because a firm may attempt multiple alliances and acquisitions every year, to better capture 
the fast-moving dynamics of feedback from these deals, following recent performance feedback 
studies (e.g., Joseph et al., 2016), we collected firm financial data at the quarterly level from 
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Compustat Quarterly. We then merge them with both alliance and acquisition data retrieved from 
Thompson Reuters’ Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. For alliance and 
acquisition performance feedback, we take advantage of the Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS)’s Daily Event Study Tool that use data from CRSP. We further compile the corporate 
diversification measure from Compustat Segment data. We lastly turn to Compustat Annual 
Industrial data to calculate variables such as market to book ratio and bankruptcy rate. After 
combining all the data from different sources with no missing variable, we end up with 886 firms 
and 6628 firm quarter observations.  
Dependent variable 
     We measure Future Acquisitions and Alliances by a simple count of total number of alliances 
(including both non-equity agreement, equity alliance, and JVs) and majority acquisitions 
announced in the next 12 quarters. As suggested in prior studies (Kacperczyk et al., 2015; 
Kuusela et al., 2017), in comparison to transaction value, count measure can better reflect the 
intensity of search. Described in detail as a robustness check, additional measure of acquisition 
and alliance count in the future 8 quarters is also tested, producing similar results. We focus on 
the time frame in the next 8 and 12 quarters because most failed alliances and acquisitions 
exhibit serious problems as early as two years into the deal (Bleeke & Ernst, 1995). Recent study 
has found that firms tend to simultaneously engage in divestments to fund acquisition activities 
(Kuusela et al., 2017). Therefore, firms are more likely to search for solutions for both alliance 
and acquisition failures.  
Independent variables 
     Following previous studies (Arikan & McGahan, 2010; Kumar et al., 2015; Gong et al., 
2017), we rely on stock market cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as a measure of deal specific 
performance feedback. As discussed in the theory section, CAR is not only commonly used to 
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measure deal performance in both acquisition (e.g. Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002; Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999) and alliance literature (e.g. Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992). Research has also 
found that managers are responsive to poor CAR in their decisions to terminate the current 
acquisitions process (Kau et al., 2008; Luo, 2005). Compared with long term measure such as 
ROA, CAR is particularly suitable to measure deal specific feedback because it can avoid 
confounding events (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). We choose our event windows at two days 
before and after the announcement day (-2,2) because (-1,1) produces significantly higher 
variations than other windows. It is possible that investors may take a while to digest the 
announcement information. To be conservative in our estimation as well as not to include 
confounding events, we use an intermediate 5-day window of (-2,2). However, we also try 
windows (-1,1) (-3,3) (-5,5) (-10,10) as robustness tests. We set the comparative market returns 
window at (-250, -45) over 200 days prior to the deal. We retrieve these CAR estimations from 
WRDS’s Daily Event Study tool. Given the number of deals, it is unrealistic for us to verify each 
deal announcement dates. We first aggregate each individual CAR at the quarterly level for both 
acquisition and alliance feedback separately. Because CAR is calculated in proportion to a firm’s 
total market value, such aggregation is appropriate in that each CAR reflects the feedback of that 
specific deal irrespective of firm’s size. A CAR of -10% represents a debacle regardless if the 
firm is worth $500 million or $5 billion. Therefore, a quarterly CAR aggregation can accurately 
measure the quality of deals announced in that specific quarter. We then sum the quarterly total 
CAR in the past 4 quarters together with the current one as our independent variables. High level 
of accumulative negative CAR indicates strong deal specific performance shortfalls. 
Alternatively, as we will detail in the robustness test, we use average instead of total CAR that 
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produces similar results. We also try the total quarterly CAR in the last 3, 5, and 8 quarters with 
consistent findings.  
Control variables 
     To rule out alternative explanations, we include a number of commonly used control variables 
in the previous studies (Iyer & Miller, 2008; Kuusela et al., 2017). We first control the size of the 
firm as the natural logarithm of its total assets (Log Total Assets) to account for the skewness of 
the data. Because organizational performance feedback may also trigger acquisition and alliance 
activities (Iyer & Miller, 2008; Kuusela et al., 2017; Tyler & Canal, 2015), we control a firm’s 
financial performance with a simple return on sales measure. We choose ROS over ROA 
because ROS can better reflect the quarterly fluctuations. A firm’s quarterly ROS is further 
splined into above and below its historical ROS because positive performance feedback leads to 
reduced problemistic searches. We control a firm’s R&D Intensity by dividing its quarterly R&D 
expenses over total quarterly sales. Following the precedents (Iyer & Miller, 2008, Kuusela et 
al., 2017), we also calculate an Altman’s Z score to control for Bankruptcy Risk.18 Consistent 
with Iyer and Miller (2008), higher Altman’s Z score is related to lower bankruptcy risk and 
possibly higher acquisition rates. We obtain a firm’s financials needed to compute this variable 
from its end of year financial data in the same year as the current quarter. Similarly, we then 
compute market to book ratio (M/B Ratio) to control for growth opportunities.19 Since firm 
market value data only became available after 1998, our data starts are truncated prior to 1998. 
We also account for the level of free cash flow that has been found to be linked to more 
unrelated diversification in the pecking order financing model (Jensen, 1986; Myers, 1984; 
                                                          
18 “Altman’s (1983) Z score is calculated as (1.2 x working capital divided by total assets) + (1.4 x retained 
earnings divided by total assets) + (3.3 x income before interest and taxes divided by total assets) + (0.6 x 
market value of equity divided by total liability) + (1.0 x sales divided by total assets).” (Kuusela et al., 2017) 
19 Following Iyer and Miller (2008), M/B ratio is calculated as (market value of equity + book value of liability – book equity – 
deferred taxes)/book value of assets. 
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Myers & Majluf, 1984).20 Corporate Diversification is measured using an Entropy index 
calculated as ∑ pit * ln(1 / pit), in which pit represents the amount of assets from segment j at time 
t (Kuusela et al., 2017). Next, we try to control the influence of slack with a slack index that 
includes potential slack (debt/equity ratio), absorbed slack (SG&A/sales), and unabsorbed slack 
(current ratio = current assets / current liabilities). Following Tyler and Caner (2015), we 
calculate each category separately before standardizing and summing them into a slack index. 
We then calculate the acquisition and alliance experience by counting the total number of 
acquisitions and alliances that the firm has taken 8 quarters before the current quarter. We create 
another pair of variables that measure acquisition and alliance rate as the count of recent 
acquisitions and alliances taken within the last 8 quarters. Previous studies have also made 
similar distinctions in terms of these related yet different constructs (Laamanen & Keil, 2008; 
Castellaneta & Zollo, 2014). Experience has been found to alleviate the negative performance 
impact of high activity load (Castellaneta & Zollo, 2014). At the same time, they also serve as 
lagged dependent variable to control for potential endogeneity and strategic momentum 
(Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Haleblian et al., 2006). Because alliance often precedes acquisition 
as minority equity investment, to rule out the possibility that acquisition decision may result 
from alliances, we control for the concurrent alliance activities as the total count of future 
alliances in the next 12 quarters (Kuusela et al., 2017). Lastly, we add year and industry controls 
to account for eccentric industry and year effects on acquisitions such as merger waves 
(McNamara, Haleblian, and Dykes, 2008). 
                                                          
20 Free cash flow is calculated as (operating income – taxes – interest expense -preferred dividend – common dividend)/ equity 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Iyer & Miller, 2008) 
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ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
     Because the dependent variable of interest is the count of future acquisitions, both Poisson 
and negative binomial model are suitable for estimation. We choose negative binomial 
estimation over Poisson because the dependent variable is over-dispersed. We nevertheless run 
an additional robustness check with fixed effects Poisson model that produce robust standard 
errors; the results are consistent with those from the negative binomial model. A problem with 
fixed effects count models is that observations that take the value of zero are dropped out of the 
sample. This practice may lead to estimation bias. To maintain the integrity and completeness of 
our sample, we decide to use random effects negative binomial estimator (Kuusela et al., 2017). 
However, we still run fixed effects negative binomial as an additional check that produces 
similar results. We also winsorize all our variables at 1% level to exclude any potential outliers. 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
     Table 1 produces the correlation table and descriptive statistics. Although alliance and 
acquisition experience and rates variables are all highly correlated, the average model variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) are at 2.11. The VIFs for those highly correlated variables share range 
from 3.18 to 4.24, way below the level of 10 deemed to be prone for multicollinearity. 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
      We present our random effects negative binomial regression results in Table 2. Most control 
variables such as firm total assets show the expected effects. We didn’t find any significant 
effects of positive or negative ROS performance discrepancy on future acquisitions perhaps 
because the ROS is measured at the quarterly level. It is noteworthy that in Model 7, 8, and 9, 
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below aspiration ROS performances prompt more future alliances. It is natural to find R&D 
intensity to be strongly and negatively associated with future acquisitions as internal 
development serves as a substitute for external sourcing. Contrary to Iyer and Miller (2008), we 
find M/B ratio to be a positive predictor of future acquisitions. It is possible that firms with high 
growth prospect may require access to more external resources. A firm’s corporate 
diversification level is also significantly related to more future acquisitions. While future 
acquisitions do not seem to display any connection with slack index, it is positively influenced 
by free cash flow. Unexpectedly, recent acquisition and alliance experience seem to reduce 
future acquisitions. This may be explained by firm’s desire to ease the negative influence of 
heavy activity load to digest the acquired units (Castellaneta & Zollo, 2014).  
     In Model 1 and 2, we gradually add the alliance and acquisition feedback variables. Both 
variables are negatively and significantly associated with future acquisitions. After we entered 
both variables simultaneously in Model 3, the results continue to be negative and significant for 
both alliance (p < .01) and acquisition feedback (p < .001). Therefore, we find strong supports 
for H1 and H2b while rejecting H2a. The interpretations for the results are complicated by the 
non-linear nature of negative binomial maximum likelihood model. We rely on incidence rate 
ratios (IRR) to inform us the practical magnitude of the effect. Compared with a 10% positive 
total acquisition feedback, a symmetrical negative 10% total CAR increases the number of future 
acquisition attempts by about 8%. A similar magnitude of change in alliance feedback increases 
the number of future acquisitions by about 5%, controlling for acquisition feedback.21  
                                                          
21 Although this effect magnitude may seem small, it is comparable to the effect of other variables including M/B ratio, 
diversification, free cash flow, and bankruptcy risk in our model. 
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     H3a predicts that the negative relationship between alliance performance feedback are 
weakened by the increase of acquisition feedback, while H3b expects the opposite. To test these 
two competing hypotheses, we entered an interaction variable between alliance and acquisition 
feedback in Model 4. The interactive term is negative and significant (p < .05), suggesting that 
the negative effect of alliance feedback on future acquisitions are strengthened by the increase of 
acquisition feedback. This finding thus provides support for H3b over H3a. One problem with 
the interaction effect measure is that though counterintuitively, it may be argued that the negative 
relationship between acquisition feedback and future acquisitions is strengthened by positive 
alliance feedback. Hence, we use the level of corporate diversification as an alternative measure 
for acquisition capability (Kaul & Wu, 2016) by interacting it with both alliance and acquisition 
feedback in Model 5. Whereas the interaction between acquisition feedback and level of 
corporate diversification is insignificant, we observe that the negative relationship between 
alliance feedback and future acquisitions is reinforced by high level of corporate diversification 
(p < .001). This result further supports Hypothesis 3b. We then enter the interactions between 
alliance feedback with both acquisition feedback and diversification in Model 6. The significant 
interaction effects reported in both Model 4 and 5 continue to hold. This result indicates that 
acquisition feedback and diversification independently influence the negative effects of alliance 
feedback on future acquisitions. It is also interesting to note the interaction between 
diversification and acquisition feedback is not significant, showing a firm’s diversification level 
does not lead to more acquisitions in response to poor acquisition performances. We plotted the 
interaction effects in Figure 1 and 2 for a graphic presentation. Consistent with both Model 4 and 
5, the negative effects of alliance feedback and future acquisitions become stronger at high level 
of acquisition feedback and corporate diversification. 
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------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 & 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Robustness Tests 
     We conducted several robustness tests using alternative measures to gauge the reliability of 
the results. First, instead of using event windows (-2,2), we tested multiple alternative event 
windows including (-1,1) (-3,3) (-5,5) (-10,10). The results remain largely consistent with the 
smaller windows, but not the longer windows. Second, we winsorized the variables from at 5% 
level instead of 1% to further rule out any potential outliers. The results are consistent with the 
1% winsorize. Third, we checked the influences of acquisition and alliance feedback in the next 
8 quarters rather than 12 quarters. Both main effects and moderating effects continue to be 
significant. Fourth, as an alternative specification, while aware of the drawbacks of ratio 
measure, following (Kuusela et al., 2017), we still adopted an alternative dependent variable and 
specification and ran a random-effects GLS panel models. We measured the dependent variable 
based on the number of acquisitions over alliances in the future 8 or 12 quarters. This approach 
inadvertently dropped observations where there is no alliance conducted. The results reported in 
Table 3 are largely consistent with those from the Table 2. While the results for acquisition over 
alliance ratio measure is consistent with the count measure for the next 8 quarters (p < 0.05), the 
acquisition feedback predictor is not significant for the future 12 quarters.  
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Fifth, as one of the preconditions for a hierarchy search process, though we did not formerly 
hypothesize it, we still tested to see how alliance and acquisition performance feedbacks as well 
as their interactions affect future alliances. In line with the prediction outlined in the search 
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hierarchy, the results are not significant across the broad, suggesting that alliances are not 
searched as potential solutions for failed alliances and acquisitions. Sixth, we also changed the 
total performance feedback to average performance feedback and the aggregation of CAR in the 
last 4 quarters to last 5 or 3 quarters. These changes produced similar results. Seventh, we also 
explored the possibility that proposed relationship may be non-linear by including squared terms 
for both acquisition and alliance feedback. Though the square term for alliance feedback do not 
show any effect, interestingly, the acquisition performance feedback square displays consistent 
strong positive relationships with future acquisition rates, suggesting a positive curvilinear effect. 
This finding may suggest that both strong and weak acquisition performance feedback increase 
future acquisitions, thereby helping to bridge our findings with the momentum effects from 
Haleblian et al. (2006). To further examine this curvilinear effect, we splined the acquisition 
performance feedback at zero, creating two new variables by assigning value zero to all negative 
and positive feedback separately. Although the negative spline function (positive values are 
assigned value zero) are negatively and significantly associated with future acquisitions, 
providing robust support to Hypothesis 2b, positive spline functions are not significantly 
connected to acquisitions in any way. Hence, we remain cautious and skeptical in terms of our 
curvilinear finding. Lastly, we further examined how acquisition and alliance feedback may 
influence future alliances. As demonstrated in Model 7, 8 and 9 of Table 2, the results are 
insignificant, showing that neither acquisition nor alliance failures trigger more future alliances. 
This finding provides additional support to the corporate sourcing hierarchy thesis. 
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DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
      This paper investigated how performance feedback from prior alliances and acquisitions 
affect future acquisition rates. Acquisition and alliance are not strategies themselves but tools for 
executing strategies. Our results suggest that both alliance and acquisition performance 
feedbacks are negatively related to future acquisitions. We argue that when one strategic action 
fails to produce satisfactory results, firms search with increasingly more complex and risky 
solutions till the strategic need is satisfied. As we do not limit ourselves to IPO firms (Arikan & 
McGahan, 2010), our findings suggest that the influences of alliance and acquisition 
performance feedback are not constrained by initial path dependency (Dyer et al., 2004). 
Moreover, we also tested the interaction effects between alliance and acquisition feedback on 
future acquisitions. Our results indicate that the effects of alliance negative feedback on future 
acquisitions are strengthened with the increase of acquisition performances. 
     Theoretically, this paper integrates the risk-taking factor into solution search sequence in the 
problemistic search process. Risk taking has often been invoked when studying organizational 
change through problemistic search (e.g., Baum et al., 2005; Desai, 2008; Iyer & Miller, 2008; 
Chen & Miller, 2007). Such synonymous mentions, however, have come under criticism recently 
(Kacperczyk et al., 2015). We share their critique that the risk construct derives from prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and further dissect risk in term of variances of potential 
outcomes (Kacperczyk et al., 2015) from risk taking in terms of the money on the table (Boyle & 
Shapira, 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Whilst the former may not go hand in hand with 
organizational changes (Kacperczyk et al., 2015), the latter often takes the form of resource 
invested in solution implementations (Audia & Greve, 2006; Desai, 2008; Iyer & Miller, 2008). 
Although myriads of studies have assumed risk taking in problemistic search (see Shinkle, 2012 
for a review), based on our knowledge, this is the first study of its kind that applies risk taking in 
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the form of resource investments to explain the direction and sequence of problemistic search. 
This escalating search process is directional and sequential as simple solutions are unlikely to be 
sought after the failures of more complex, costlier, and risker ones. Instead of treating all 
potential solutions as homogeneous ‘bandits’ randomly pulled through trials and errors (Denrell 
& March, 2001; Posen & Levinthal, 2012), in the context of ‘problemistic search’, firms may 
search sequentially based not only on a solution’s proximity to problem symptom (Cyert & 
March, 1963) but also on its perceived relative complexity, risk, and costs within a hierarchy of 
potential solutions. While we are agnostic about under what circumstances does the cost 
hierarchy dominant, we contribute to the performance feedback theory another dimension of 
solution search hierarchy, on top of the existing hierarchies that favors local over distant searches 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal, 1997) and success over failure in performance feedbacks 
(Denrell & March, 2001; Posen & Levinthal, 2012).  
      This paper also introduces the concept of perceived solution implementation cost that has 
always been assumed away in the problemistic search literature. Answering the call from 
Puranam, Stieglitz, Osman, and Pillutla (2015), our study thus bridges the gap between 
modelling and a messy world. In computer simulation and laboratory experiments, the costs of 
solution execution are non-existent (e.g., Denrell, 2008; Levinthal, 1997; Billinger et al., 2014), 
but in a real world, where bounded rational decision makers may perceive certain solutions as 
costlier than others may reserve them as the last resorts. By relaxing the stringent definition of 
bounded rationality, we contend that though managers may not have perfect knowledge on the 
effectiveness and efficiency on every potential solution, they may perceive certain solutions to be 
risker and costlier than others. Such cognitive bias may cause decision makers to consider these 
solutions as last resorts. 
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     Furthermore, when acquisition and alliance activities are viewed as strategic thrusts (Ansoff, 
1979) rather than isolated deals, instead of calling the acquisition method into question 
(Haleblian et al., 2006), negative acquisition feedbacks reflect failures to satisfy strategic needs 
and spur more ‘problemistic searches’ near the problem symptoms. Our results are consistent 
with the unexpected finding from Arikan and McGahan (2010) who also took an acquisition 
program view of performance feedback. Acquisition feedback may both serve as an endorsement 
that reaffirms current strategy as well as a thermometer that activates ‘problemistic search’. It is 
possible that individual acquisition feedback has a reassuring effect on the subsequent deal, 
while weak periodical acquisition feedbacks reflect unsatisfactory executions of the entire 
strategy. Or perhaps as acknowledged in their limitations (Haleblian et al., 2006), the positive 
momentum effect may be limited to their unique empirical setting of commercial banking 
industry which views acquisition as a tool for horizontal growth (Kim et al., 2011). 
     Phenomenologically, we contribute to the literature on the behavioral antecedents of 
acquisition (e.g., Haleblian et al., 2006; Iyer & Miller, 2008; Kuusela et al., 2017). Our results 
suggest that searched as remedies, acquisitions are preceded by negative alliance and acquisition 
feedback. Whilst strong alliance performances may reinforce the future use of alliance (Arikan & 
McGahan 2010), weak alliance and acquisition performances trigger acquisitions following 
‘problemistic search’ as acquisition sits at the pinnacle of complex, risky, and costly solutions.  
     This is also the first study known to us that examined the interactions between acquisition and 
alliance feedback. Although previous studies have considered the interplays among multiple 
goals and aspirations (e.g. Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 2008; Kim et al., 2015), little is known 
regarding the interactions between two substitutive strategic tools. Alliance and acquisition 
feedback signify not only problems but also capabilities. Our results suggest that acquisition is 
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more likely to be sought as a solution for failed alliances after it has demonstrated success. This 
paper thus contributes to the BTF and the ‘direction of search’ question (Shinkle, 2012). 
     There are several limitations in this study that provide ample future research opportunities.  
First, though we postulate a hierarchy of organizational sourcing, given the data availability, we 
are only able to test the interplays between alliances and acquisitions. Future studies should also 
include the search process in internal development and arm’s length transaction in their 
examinations (Lungeanu, Stern, & Zajac, 2016). Second, we didn’t differentiate different types 
of alliances. Alliances can range from relatively simple licensing agreements to more 
complicated equity alliances and JVs. Before moving to acquisition, firms may turn to more 
complex alliances first (Capron & Mitchell, 2012). Third, despite our assumption of underlying 
strategies, we are unable to determine whether these alliance and acquisition programs serve any 
strategic purpose. More specifically, we don’t know if these deals occurred in the recent past are 
intended to achieve one or multiple strategic objectives. It is conceivable that if multiple 
acquisitions that pursue one strategy fail, the strategy may be abandoned. Fourth, although we 
base our study on the BTF and problemistic search, we are unable to verify if the new 
acquisitions are intended to accomplish the unfinished business from prior alliances or 
acquisitions. It is possible that the new acquisitions are pursued for completely different 
purposes. Future studies may need to code individual deals into specific strategies to address this 
problem. Fifth, while we looked at the interaction between alliance and acquisition feedback, an 
interesting future research idea is to study the interplay between organizational level aspiration 
and deal specific feedback. Recent studies have called for the attention to understand the 
‘direction of search’ (e.g. Shinkle, 2012; Greve & Zhang, 2016). Consistent with the logic in this 
paper, strong recent performances may guide the directions of future searches of organizational 
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performance shortfall. Finally, though we intend to add perceived solution complexity, risks, and 
costs as another dimension to the ‘problemistic search’ process, we are unable to tell how firms 
process and resolve the conflicts between different search rules. Future studies should examine 
the contingent factors that elevate one from the others. For instance, under what circumstances 
are familiar yet costly solutions chosen over simple but distant ones? What role does past 
experience play in amplifying or diminishing the concern for solution costs? 
     Our study shows a hierarchical sequence in firm’s searches for strategic sourcing, with 
acquisition perched at the top as a last resort (Capron & Mitchell, 2012). Theoretically, we argue 
that firms may not always engage in reinforcement learning (Denrell & March, 2001) and 
reflexively choose the alternative after failures (Dyer et al., 2004) or search in the neighborhood 
of problem symptoms before expanding the radius of search to distant areas (Cyert & March, 
1963). Depending on the perceived relative complexity and costs of the current choice and its 
alternatives, firms may continue ‘local search’ with increasing complexity rather than reverting 
to lower level simpler alternatives. We also further inform the acquisition literature in the 
relationship between acquisition performance feedback and future acquisitions. Not only didn’t 
we find a positive feedback multiplier effect as a result of reinforcement learning (Haleblian et 
al., 2006), we found the opposite effect. Our finding suggests that this relationship is far more 
complex than previously expected. Indeed, our robustness test even uncovered a curvilinear 
effect. More future works are needed to understand the different boundaries and contingencies 
that influence this phenomenon. 
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GRAPH 1:  Hierarchy of Search in Sickness 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: The Moderating Effect of Acquisition Feedback 
 
 
FIGURE 2: The Moderating Effect of Corporate Diversification 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17   
1 Future Acquisitions                    
2 Future Alliances 0.59                   
3 Log Total Assets 0.57 0.38                  
4 
Above Historical 
Aspirations (ROS) -0.08 -0.04 -0.21              
   
5 
Below Historical 
Aspirations (ROS) 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.13             
   
6 R&D Intensity  -0.15 -0.06 -0.26 0.22 -0.20               
7 Bankruptcy Risk 0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.00              
8 M/B Ratio 0.16 0.19 0.05 0.12 -0.02 0.08 0.47             
9 Diversification 0.23 0.13 0.37 -0.08 0.09 -0.23 -0.13 -0.08            
10 Free Cash Flow 0.12 0.06 0.28 -0.09 0.30 -0.30 0.18 0.02 0.08           
11 Slack Index -0.36 -0.23 -0.61 0.08 -0.12 0.45 0.33 -0.03 -0.43 -0.12          
12 Acquisition Experience 0.56 0.31 0.61 -0.08 0.08 -0.17 -0.10 0.01 0.33 0.11 -0.41         
13 Alliance Experience 0.62 0.58 0.46 -0.04 0.03 -0.09 -0.02 0.10 0.20 0.07 -0.28 0.71        
14 Alliance Rate 0.54 0.86 0.36 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.04 -0.21 0.30 0.59       
15 Acquisition Rate 0.66 0.40 0.52 -0.09 0.05 -0.13 0.00 0.07 0.24 0.08 -0.34 0.57 0.52 0.44      
16 Acquisition Feedback -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01     
17 Alliance Feedback -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03    
 Mean  6.75 6.68 7.18 0.01 0.00 0.13 5.89 0.34 0.41 0.00 0.83 15.19 52.96 6.37 3.93 0.00 0.01   
 S.D. 9.48 17.52 2.18 0.02 0.02 0.17 7.45 0.86 0.61 0.19 1.77 26.10 162.01 15.99 4.84 0.09 0.07   
 
TABLE 2: Random Effects Future Acquisition Counts in The Next 12 Quarters Results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log Total Assets 0.236*** 
(0.02) 
0.238*** 
(0.02) 
0.236*** 
(0.02) 
0.234*** 
(0.02) 
0.235*** 
(0.02) 
0.233*** 
(0.02) 
0.195*** 
(0.02) 
0.195*** 
(0.02) 
0.196*** 
(0.02) 
Above Historical 
Aspirations (ROS) 
-0.885 
(0.61) 
-0.918 
(0.61) 
-0.862 
(0.61) 
-0.835 
(0.61) 
-0.920 
(0.61) 
-0.895 
(0.61) 
0.255 
(0.59) 
0.258 
(0.59) 
0.256 
(0.59) 
Below Historical 
Aspirations (ROS) 
0.834 
(0.57) 
0.774 
(0.57) 
0.813 
(0.57) 
0.799 
(0.57) 
0.774 
(0.57) 
0.759 
(0.57) 
1.170* 
(0.56) 
1.170* 
(0.56) 
1.163* 
(0.56) 
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Table 2 Continued  
R&D Intensity / Sales -0.601*** 
(0.15) 
-0.632*** 
(0.15) 
-0.615*** 
(0.15) 
-0.614*** 
(0.15) 
-0.631*** 
(0.15) 
-0.629*** 
(0.15) 
0.218* 
(0.11) 
0.215+ 
(0.11) 
0.214+ 
(0.11) 
Bankruptcy Risk 0.005** 
(0.00) 
0.005* 
(0.00) 
0.005* 
(0.00) 
0.004* 
(0.00) 
0.004* 
(0.00) 
0.004* 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
M/B Ratio 0.092*** 
(0.02) 
0.097*** 
(0.02) 
0.098*** 
(0.02) 
0.099*** 
(0.02) 
0.096*** 
(0.02) 
0.098*** 
(0.02) 
0.024 
(0.02) 
0.026 
(0.02) 
0.025 
(0.02) 
Diversification 
(Entropy) 
0.111*** 
(0.03) 
0.109*** 
(0.03) 
0.107*** 
(0.03) 
0.109*** 
(0.03) 
0.110*** 
(0.03) 
0.112*** 
(0.03) 
-0.013 
(0.03) 
-0.013 
(0.03) 
-0.012 
(0.03) 
Free Cash Flow 0.203* 
(0.09) 
0.201* 
(0.09) 
0.198* 
(0.09) 
0.202* 
(0.09) 
0.204* 
(0.09) 
0.209* 
(0.09) 
-0.053 
(0.08) 
-0.053 
(0.08) 
-0.053 
(0.08) 
Slack Index 0.020 
(0.01) 
0.020 
(0.01) 
0.020 
(0.01) 
0.019 
(0.01) 
0.021 
(0.01) 
0.020 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
Acquisition 
Experience 
-0.013*** 
(0.00) 
-0.013*** 
(0.00) 
-0.013*** 
(0.00) 
-0.013*** 
(0.00) 
-0.012*** 
(0.00) 
-0.012*** 
(0.00) 
-0.002* 
(0.00) 
-0.002* 
(0.00) 
-0.002* 
(0.00) 
Alliance  
Experience 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.001*** 
(0.00) 
-0.001*** 
(0.00) 
-0.001*** 
(0.00) 
Alliance Rate -0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
0.002** 
(0.00) 
0.001** 
(0.00) 
0.002** 
(0.00) 
Acquisition Rate  0.005** 
(0.00) 
 0.005** 
(0.00) 
 0.005** 
(0.00) 
 0.005** 
(0.00) 
 0.005** 
(0.00) 
 0.005** 
(0.00) 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
Future Alliances  0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
      
Alliance Feedback -0.246** 
(0.09) 
  -0.241
** 
(0.09) 
-0.253** 
(0.09) 
0.039 
(0.12) 
0.040 
(0.12) 
-0.012 
(0.10) 
-0.013 
(0.10) 
  
Acquisition Feedback   -0.417
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.414*** 
(0.08) 
-0.392*** 
(0.08) 
-0.468*** 
(0.10) 
-0.426*** 
(0.10) 
0.088 
(0.09) 
  0.089 
(0.09) 
Alliance # 
Acquisition Feedback 
      -2.004
* 
(0.88) 
  -2.221
* 
(0.88) 
      
Alliance # Entropy 
Diversification 
        -0.457
*** 
(0.12) 
-0.479*** 
(0.12) 
      
Acquisition # Entropy 
Diversification 
        0.103 
(0.10) 
0.073 
(0.10) 
      
N 6628 6628 6628 6628 6628 6628 6628 6628 6628 
Chi-squared 1066.63 1086.90 1099.713 1107.960 1129.470 1140.579 3567.748 3566.800 3568.335 
Two tailed p-value for all variables. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Year and industry controls are included 
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TABLE 3: Future Acquisition / Alliance Ratio Random Effects GLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)     
 (-2,2) 
t+12 
(-2,2) 
t+12 
(-2,2) 
t+8 
(-2,2) 
t+8 
(-3,3)   
t+8 
    
Log Total Assets 0.132* 
(0.05) 
0.134* 
(0.05) 
0.190** 
(0.04) 
0.110** 
(0.04) 
0.111*** 
(0.04) 
    
Above Historical 
Aspirations (ROS) 
1.977 
(1.92) 
-1.936 
 (1.925) 
1.493 
(1.49) 
1.544 
(1.49) 
1.571 
(1.488) 
    
Below Historical 
Aspirations (ROS) 
-3.888* 
(1.918) 
-3.866* 
(1.918) 
-2.478 
(1.52) 
-2.490 
(1.521) 
-2.439 
(1.521) 
    
R&D Intensity Sales -0.268 
(0.323) 
-0.268 
(0.323) 
-0.250 
(0.24) 
-0.251 
(0.24) 
-0.256 
(0.237) 
    
Bankruptcy Risk -0.018* 
(0.01) 
-0.018* 
(0.01) 
 0.011* 
(0.01) 
 0.011* 
(0.01) 
-0.011* 
(0.01) 
    
M/B Ratio 0.133* 
(0.06) 
0.129*** 
(0.06) 
0.142** 
(0.05) 
0.146** 
(0.05) 
0.143** 
(0.05) 
    
Diversification 
(Entropy) 
0.148 
(0.11) 
0.145 
(0.11) 
0.137+ 
(0.08) 
0.137+ 
(0.08) 
0.140+ 
(0.08) 
    
Free Cash Flow 0.14 
(0.24) 
0.127 
(0.24) 
0.125 
(0.17) 
0.130 
(0.17) 
0.128 
(0.17) 
    
Standard Slack Index -0.066 
(0.05) 
-0.064 
(0.05) 
0.005 
(0.03) 
0.005 
(0.03) 
0.006 
(0.03) 
    
Acquisition 
Experience  
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
 0.005+ 
(0.00) 
 0.005+ 
(0.00) 
 0.005+ 
(0.00) 
    
Alliance Experience -0.005*** 
(0.00) 
-0.005*** 
(0.00) 
-0.003*** 
(0.00) 
-0.003*** 
(0.00) 
-0.003*** 
(0.00) 
    
Alliance Rate   0.006+ 
(0.00) 
 0.006+ 
(0.00) 
0.007* 
(0.00) 
0.007* 
(0.00) 
0.007* 
(0.00) 
    
Acquisition Rate   0.067*** 
(0.01) 
 0.067*** 
(0.01) 
0.061*** 
(0.01) 
0.061*** 
(0.01) 
0.061*** 
(0.01) 
    
Future Alliances  -0.036*** 
(0.00) 
-0.036*** 
(0.00) 
-0.031*** 
(0.00) 
-0.031*** 
(0.00) 
-0.031*** 
(0.00) 
    
Alliance Feedback -1.078* 
(0.43) 
-1.090* 
(0.43) 
-0.792* 
(0.34) 
-0.776* 
(0.34) 
-0.677* 
(0.28) 
    
Acquisition Feedback 0.387 
(0.378) 
0.275 
(0.373) 
-0.492* 
(0.29) 
-0.386* 
(0.29) 
-0.558* 
(0.25) 
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Acquisition * 
Alliance Feedback   
-7.563+ 
(4.198) 
    -6.891
* 
(3.25) 
     
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     
N 4994 4994 5049 5049 5049     
Chi-squared 827.35 823.41 919.21 923.95 921.56     
R2 0.182 0.182 0.229 0.229 0.229     
Two tailed p-value for all variables. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Year and industry controls are included 
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CHAPTER 3:  TARGET KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURE AND POST-
ACQUISITION TARGET CEO RETENTION 
ABSTRACT 
Drawing upon the firm-specific resources and strategic human capital literatures, 
we develop the argument that the level of firm-specific knowledge in an acquisition 
target may affect the likelihood of the target’s CEO being retained after an 
acquisition. Specifically, due to the important role of target CEOs in preserving the 
value of and integrating firm-specific knowledge, we expect a positive relationship 
between a target’s pre-acquisition firm-specific knowledge level and the likelihood 
that its CEO is retained. Furthermore, we argue that this relationship is 
strengthened by the target’s pre-acquisition performance, which signals a higher 
value of firm-specific knowledge, and the target CEO’s tenure, which is positively 
associated with both the benefit of retaining and the cost of replacing the CEO. 
Using a sample of acquisitions involving US target firms acquired between 1995 
and 2006, we find support for our hypotheses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The importance of firm-specific knowledge assets and firm-specific human capital in 
helping firms gain and sustain superior performances has been extensively highlighted in the 
strategy literature (e.g., Coff, 1997; Wang, He, & Mahoney, 2009). As firm-specific knowledge is 
generally difficult for competitors to imitate and cannot be easily transferred to other firm settings 
(Helfat, 1994; Teece, 1986), it often constitutes an important source of firm competitive advantage. 
Furthermore, several recent studies suggest that the effective deployment of firm-specific 
knowledge often requires the investment of corresponding specialized human capital by top 
managers, especially CEOs (Wang, Zhao, & He, 2015; Wang, Zhao, & Chen, 2017). Accordingly, 
firm CEOs and their specialized human capital investments are often considered critical in 
ensuring that the firm benefits from its firm-specific knowledge and achieves superior 
performances (Barney, 1991; Castanias & Helfat, 1991, 2001).  
What is less well understood and examined in the existing literature is how the value 
generating potential of firm-specific knowledge may be affected when a firm is under the risk of 
leadership change, and further how the knowledge structure and specifically the level of firm-
specific knowledge in such firms may in turn affect the likelihood of CEO turnover. This is an 
important omission as there is likely to be an interrelationship between firm-specific knowledge 
and CEO firm-specific human capital, which would imply that firm-specific knowledge also might 
have an influence on the benefits and costs associated with replacing or retaining a CEO. In this 
study, we fill this gap by examining this issue in the context of acquisitions and explore how the 
level of firm-specific knowledge in the target firm may affect an acquirer’s decision to replace or 
retain the target’s CEO. 
In general, the decision to retain or terminate a target CEO represents an important decision 
that is likely to affect value creation in an acquisition. However, this decision seems to be complex 
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and contingent on a number of factors. Not surprisingly, there is a growing and burgeoning 
literature (for a recent review see Bilgili, Calderon, Allen, & Kedia, 2017) that looks at the factors 
that drive post-acquisition CEO retention in the target firm. This literature has considered factors 
such as target performance (Hambrick & Cannela, 1993; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991; Wulf & Singh, 
2011), target CEO’s relative standing in the new company (Hambrick & Cannela, 1993; Lubatkin, 
Schweiger, & Weber, 1999), factors related to target CEO’s human capital (Buchholtz et al., 2003), 
and acquirers’ corporate governance standards (Wulf & Singh, 2011). However, to date, relatively 
little attention has been paid to the influence of target firms’ resource base on the decision to retain 
the target CEO.  
In the context of acquisitions, acquirers often aim to access and acquire target firm-specific 
knowledge (e.g., Kaul & Wu, 2016; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). However, it would be difficult 
for the acquirer to take full advantage of firm-specific knowledge acquired without the cooperation 
of the target’s CEO (Bergh, 2001; Graebner, 2004; Zollo & Singh, 2004), given the 
interrelationship between firm-specific knowledge and CEO firm-specific human capital. We thus 
argue that the likelihood of a target CEO’s retention increases with the level of firm-specific 
knowledge in the target. Furthermore, we try to further disentangle the mechanisms underlying 
this proposed baseline relationship by exploring a few contingency factors. First, we argue that our 
baseline effect may become stronger when a target has demonstrated strong pre-acquisition 
performance which suggests that the target’s firm-specific knowledge is of higher value. In 
addition, we argue that our baseline effect will be stronger when the target CEO has longer tenure, 
which relates to the importance of target CEO in terms of his/her accumulated firm-specific human 
capital and the amount of cost associated with replacing the target CEO. We test our predictions 
using a sample of acquisitions involving US targets from 1995 to 2006. 
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We aim to make several contributions to the existing literature. First, we contribute to the 
literature on the resource-based view of the firm and literature on firm-specific knowledge by 
elaborating on the role of the CEO (in our case the target’s CEO) in realizing the value of such 
knowledge for the firm in the context of acquisitions. Specifically, while firm-specific knowledge 
often can be a source of a firm’s competitive advantage, we also show that retaining the CEO is 
important for leveraging and retaining this value.  
Second, we aim to contribute to the post-acquisition executive retention literature (e.g., 
Hambrick & Cannela, 1993; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991; Wulf & Singh, 2011) by focusing on the 
role of firm-specific knowledge, an important target feature that so far has received little scholarly 
attention. Our findings shed light on the importance of a target’s knowledge structure in the target 
CEO retention decision, especially when a target has achieved superior performances prior to the 
deal. By drawing from the resource based view and extending the literature on firm-specific 
knowledge, this study thus enriches our understanding of target CEO retention decision.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Target CEOs Post-Acquisition Turnover 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have become one of the most popular strategic tools 
utilized by managers to pursue their strategic objectives. However, despite their popularity, there 
is an increasing body of empirical evidence that suggests that the majority of deals fail to create 
value for the acquirer (e.g., King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004; Cuypers, Cuypers & Martin, 
2017). This can be at least partially attributed to the complex and disruptive nature of the post-
acquisition integration process, in which the sources of value which the acquirer intends to capture 
are often destroyed (e.g., Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Such value destruction 
can be caused by the departure of a target firm’s CEO who often embodies a considerable source 
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of value for the acquirer. Namely, in many cases the target firm’s CEO has accumulated valuable 
knowledge about the target firm and may play a vital role in post-acquisition integration (Bergh, 
2001; Butler, Perryman, & Ranft, 2012; Cannela & Hambrick, 1993; Haleblian et al., 2009). 
Indeed, it has been shown that the retention of target’s CEO can mitigate the disruption caused in 
an acquisition (Graebner, 2004; Zollo & Singh, 2004). However, retaining the CEO in a target firm 
is not a given for an acquirer. For example, when an acquisition is aimed at creating value by 
improving a poorly performing target, the departure of its CEO often becomes a desirable and 
necessary outcome. Furthermore, in some cases, entrenched target CEOs may also pose an obstacle 
to post-acquisition integration (Buchholtz, Ribbens, & Houle,  2003; Cannela & Hambrick, 1993).  
 Given the importance of the issue it is not surprising that management scholars have 
studied the post-acquisition turnover of target firm’s CEOs for three decades (e.g., Walsh, 1988; 
1989) (for a review see Krug and Aguilera (2004), Krug, Wright, and Kroll (2014), and Bilgili et 
al., (2017)). Early work in this body of research primarily drew from agency theory and focused 
on the market discipline hypothesis which argues that acquirers often take over badly performing 
targets to replace the CEO, thereby trying improving target’s performance. While M&As have 
been found to be positively related to abnormal target executives and CEO turnover (Walsh, 1988; 
Walsh & Ellwood, 1991), there is little evidence that acquirers indeed commonly engage in M&As 
as corporate raider to rid of CEOs and other top managers (Krug et al., 2014; Walsh & Kosnik, 
1993).  
Another stream of work in this literature has instead focused on reasons why some target 
CEOs are retained. They found that acquirers often retain executives from targets with good pre-
acquisition performance as this is an indication of their competence (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). 
The retention of target executives then in turn contributes to better acquisition outcomes because 
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they represent an “intrinsic component of the acquired firm's resource base” (Cannela & Hambrick, 
1993: 137). Subsequent work examined a number of other factors that influence target CEO 
retention. For example, drawing from the resource based view, Bergh (2001) studied the effect of 
target CEOs’ organizational tenure on CEO retention and post-acquisition performance. However, 
although target CEO tenure has been found to improve post-acquisition performance (Bergh, 2001), 
several studies failed to uncover an association with post-acquisition retention (e.g., Buchholtz et 
al., 2003; Wulf & Singh, 2011). Some other studies suggest that acquirers also tend to value and 
retain target CEOs who can bring in complementary functional skills (Krishnan et al., 1997) or 
industry knowledge (Buchholtz et al., 2003) that the acquirer lacks.  
While several of the afore-mentioned studies draw from the resource based view, none of 
these studies has directly taken into consideration the role of the target’s knowledge structure, and 
its level of firm-specific knowledge in particular, in influencing target CEO retention. By directly 
examining the level of firm-specific knowledge of targets, we aim to make an important extension 
to the existing resource based view explanations or target CEO retention. 
Firm-specific Knowledge Resources and the Role of CEOs 
The resource based view (RBV) argues that a firm’s competitive advantage lies in its 
resources, especially in the knowledge based resources that the firm possesses (Barney, 1991; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1984). Given the importance of knowledge in the RBV, it is 
not surprising that scholars have explored differences among firms’ resources and identified that 
knowledge resources can also be further categorized as general knowledge that is universally 
applicable and firm-specific knowledge that is tailored for a specific organizational context 
(Becker, 1964; Williamson, 1988). While both types of knowledge are important, firm-specific 
knowledge is of particular importance to a firm’s competitiveness. The development of firm-
specific knowledge resources generally requires long term path dependent investments that build 
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on a firm’s existing knowledge base (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 
1993). As a result, firm-specific knowledge assets are particularly difficult for competitors to 
imitate (Helfat, 1994; Teece, 1986), and cannot be easily transferred to another firm setting without 
incurring significant value loss (Grant, 1996). As a result, they often contribute to a firm gaining 
a competitive advantage.  
Another important feature of firm-specific knowledge resources, as compared to physical 
or other non-specific organizational resources, is that they rarely generate value for the firm 
independently (Helfat, 1994; Teece, 1986). Instead, their effective deployment is often coupled 
with the corresponding human capital embedded in the CEO and other (top) managers (Wang, 
Zhao, & He, 2015; Wang, Zhao, & Chen, 2017). Accordingly, CEOs often play a pivotal role in 
the resource based view as the bridge between the possession of firm-specific valuable resources 
and superior firm performances (Barney, 1991; Castanias & Helfat, 1991, 2001). This insight is 
also emphasized by Penrose (1959: 78) who argued that the value of resources lies in the ‘services’ 
that the resources can generate, or in other words, “the capacities of the men using them…”.  Thus, 
this suggests that the mere possession of resources seems to be a necessary but insufficient 
condition for value creation (Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 2008). In order to realize the value contained 
in these resources, resources need to be effectively managed and deployed by the CEO (Mahoney, 
1995; Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007). This is particularly the case for firm-specific knowledge 
resources. The effective deployment of firm-specific knowledge generally requires specialized 
human capital from the CEO. This then in turn has implications for how beneficial or costly it is 
to replace or retain a CEO. Namely, a CEO who possesses specialized human capital that is related 
to the firm’s specific knowledge will generally be more difficult and costlier to replace. 
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In sum, firm-specific resources are of particular importance for the competitiveness of a 
firm and CEOs play an important role in the development and deployment of such resources. In 
the next section, we will apply these arguments in the context of acquisitions and explore why an 
acquirer might find it particularly important to retain the target’s CEO when firm-specific 
resources are at play. 
  
THEORY 
Target Firm-Specific Knowledge and Target CEO Retention in M&A 
In comparison to internal development, acquisitions are commonly used to plug significant 
resource gaps (Capron & Mitchell, 2009; Kaul & Wu, 2016) and to achieve strategic renewal 
(Agarwal & Helfat, 2009). Unlike lengthy path dependent internal development (Ahuja & Katila, 
2004; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Zander & Kogut, 1995), firms can obtain resources including 
firm-specific knowledge resources in a timely manner through acquisitions (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; 
Capron & Mitchell, 2009; Puranam, 2001; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). However, to create value 
in an acquisition involving a target with a high level of firm-specific knowledge, it becomes 
important for acquirers to preserve or integrate the target’s unique knowledge assets (Puranam, 
Singh, & Chaudhuri, 2009; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). We 
believe that the target’s CEO can play an important role in this for several reasons. 
As argued earlier, in a target with a high level of firm-specific knowledge, its CEO often 
develops corresponding specialized human capital which makes the CEO particularly valuable. A 
CEO’s specialized human capital may include two components: managerial human capital specific 
to the knowledge resource itself (Kor & Mahoney, 2005; Ndofor, Sirmon, and He,., 2011; Sirmon 
et al., 2008) and managerial social capital that is specific to the network of knowledge workers 
who play a more direct role in deploying the firm-specific knowledge resources (Wang et al., 2009). 
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In the first case, top managers’ specialized human capital may reflect the unique insights of 
potential opportunities associated with the firm-specific knowledge, which enables a more 
effective deployment of firm-specific knowledge resources. It has been argued that there is a co-
evolution between a CEO and a firm’s knowledge structure (e.g., Penrose, 1959), which has indeed 
been demonstrated in a number of recent studies suggesting that managerial initiatives are essential 
in the development of firm-specific knowledge (Wang et al., 2015; Kor & Mahoney, 2005: Wang 
et al., 2017). Similarly, in the acquisition context, the target’s CEO becomes highly valuable to the 
acquiring firm when the target comprises a high level of firm-specific knowledge (Buchholtz et al, 
2003; Graebner, 2004; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Not only are the CEOs of such targets more valuable, 
they are also more difficult to replace (Bergh, 2001; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). While managers 
with general human capital can be more readily hired externally from the managerial labor market 
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Custodio, Ferreira & Matos, 2013), it is more difficult to find a 
replacement that possesses human capital that is specific to the target firm. Furthermore, it is likely 
there will be additional cost for the firm as it will require time for any replacement to accumulate 
such human capital that is specific to the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  
In the second case, social capital in the form of embedded relationships with employees 
serves as the vessel, through which firm-specific knowledge resources are deployed (Kor, 2003; 
Shaw, Duffy, Johnson, & Lockhart, 2005). In the case of firm-specific knowledge, key target 
employees are likely to play a pivotal role in utilizing the firm-specific knowledge assets in order 
to effectively deploy the knowledge and gain a competitive advantage (Wang et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, the retention of these key target employees becomes particularly important in order 
to reduce the disruptive impact of the acquisition on the target’s unique knowledge base (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999) and organizational routines (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 
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1991; Zollo & Singh, 2004), thereby contributing to positive value creation and acquisition 
performance (Cannela & Hambrick, 1993; Cording, Christmann, & King, 2008).  
As a target CEO often has built specialized relationships with its employees, target 
managers’ retention helps to increase key target employee performance and engender post-
acquisition synergies (Kiessling & Harvey, 2006). In contrast, the departure of the target CEO may 
send a negative signal and instill uncertainty among key target employees already wary of their 
future prospects (Coff, 1999, 2002). This then might pose a threat to the success of the acquisition 
(Bergh, 2001; Cannela & Hambrick, 1993) as it might lead to increased target employee turnover 
(Graebner, 2004; Ranft & Lord, 2000; Raes, Bruch, & De Jong, 2013). Specifically, such turnover 
would be damaging for the acquiring firm as it might become more challenging or even impossible 
to access the target firm’s unique knowledge resources. Hence, in addition to the loss of firm-
specific managerial human capital in the target as we discussed earlier, a target CEO’s departure 
may also lead to direct loss of firm-specific knowledge due to increased employee turnover in the 
target.  
In sum, acquirers often find it difficult to manage the process of preserving the value of 
firm-specific knowledge due to the highly disruptive nature of M&As (Ranft & Lord, 2002; Zollo 
& Singh, 2004). Retaining the target’s CEO can significantly reduce the disruptive damage 
occurred in an acquisition and facilitate the preservation of firm-specific knowledge and the 
potential transfer of the knowledge from the target to the acquirer (Graebner, 2004; Ranft & Lord, 
2000; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Therefore, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between a target firm’s pre-acquisition level 
of firm-specific knowledge resources and the likelihood that the target CEO is 
retained after an acquisition. 
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So far, we have derived a baseline prediction regarding the relationship between a target’s 
firm-specific knowledge level and the likelihood of post-acquisition target CEO retention. 
However, the benefits derived from retaining the target’s CEO (or the cost of replacing the CEO) 
are likely to rise or fall under certain conditions. Therefore, we are interested in contingencies that 
affect our baseline prediction. Specifically, we propose two factors that are likely to affect the 
benefits of retaining (or the cost of replacing) the CEO of a target with a high level of firm-specific 
knowledge. The first factor is target CEO tenure, which reflects how long the CEO’s knowledge 
has been co-evolving with the target’s knowledge base. The second factor is the pre-acquisition 
financial performance of the target, which signals the value of target’s firm-specific knowledge, 
and accordingly the importance of target CEO in preserving and integrating the firm-specific 
knowledge. Together these two moderating factors will also help us improve our understanding of 
the proposed mechanisms underlying our baseline prediction. 
The Moderating Role of Target CEO Tenure 
In our baseline prediction we proposed that acquirers might benefit more from retaining 
the target CEO when the target has higher levels of firm-specific knowledge. Underlying this is 
the notion that the target CEO becomes increasingly important for the acquirer to create value as 
the target’s firm specific knowledge increases because his/her firm-specific human capital is 
critical in the preservation of firm-specific knowledge and the potential transfer of such knowledge 
from the target to the acquirer. However, even with the same level of target firm-specific 
knowledge, the importance of a target CEO may still vary depending on how much (firm-specific) 
human capital he/she has developed. We will focus on one factor that has been shown to closely 
relate to the accumulation of CEOs’ specialized human capital, namely their tenure.  
Previously we highlighted that the target CEO’s specialized human capital may include 
two components: managerial human capital specific to the knowledge resource itself (Kor & 
   
58 
 
Mahoney, 2005; Ndofor et al., 2011; Sirmon et al., 2008) and managerial social capital that is 
specific to the network of knowledge workers who play a more direct role in deploying the firm-
specific knowledge resources (Brown & Duguid, 2001; Shaw et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, we discuss below how CEO tenure might affect the development of these 
components of human capital and thereby act as a moderating factor on the relationship between 
firm-specific knowledge and CEO retention considering these components. 
First, it has been argued and demonstrated that the CEOs’ knowledge and human capital 
co-evolves with the firm’s knowledge structure (e.g., Penrose, 1959). The longer a CEO’s human 
capital has been coevolving with the firm’s knowledge base, the more likely it is customized to be 
complementary to the knowledge base as long tenured CEOs have greater incentives and 
opportunities to engage in such endeavors. Therefore, compared with a newly appointed target 
CEO, a target CEO with a long tenure is more likely to have accumulated human capital that is 
specialized to the firm-specific knowledge controlled by the firm (Wulf & Singh, 2011; Wang et 
al., 2015).  
Second, another important component of the target CEO’s human capital relates to the 
long-term cooperative relationship that he/she has developed with employees who possess firm-
specific technical knowledge (Kor, 2003; Wang et al., 2009). These relationships manifest in the 
form of social capital known as “assets embedded in relationships” (Shaw et al., 2005). A target 
CEO with longer tenure is more likely to have accumulated rich social capital related to firm-
specific knowledge resources deployment (Wang et al., 2015). Furthermore, compared with newly 
appointed CEOs, their longer tenured counterparts are more likely to have developed a common 
identity and shared purpose based on their shared experience with firm employees (e.g., Hatch & 
Dyer, 2004; Luo, Kanuri, & Andrews, 2014; Souder, Simsek, & Johnson, 2012).  
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For these reasons, we believe that retaining the target CEO will be more instrumental for 
the acquirer to benefit from the target’s firm specific knowledge when the target CEO has longer 
tenure. As a result, we expect the relationship between firm-specific knowledge and the likelihood 
that the target CEO is retained after the acquisition to be stronger when then CEO has longer tenure. 
Accordingly, we predict: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between a target’s pre-acquisition firm-specific 
knowledge resources and the retention of its CEO after an acquisition is 
strengthened by the target CEO’s pre-acquisition tenure. 
     
The Moderating Role of Target Pre-Acquisition Performance 
 Although firm-specific resources are essential for firms’ potential competitive advantage,   
they are generally associated with higher risk as compared to general resources, since the economic 
value of firm-specific resources is ultimately influenced by various factors such as firm context 
and market conditions (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Priem & Butler, 2001). For example, firm-
specific knowledge often develops and accumulates based on unique organizational contexts (Amit 
& Schoemaker, 1993; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993). The often path dependent nature of 
firm-specific knowledge might then constrain the directions of future development and application 
(Helfat, 1994). In line with this argument, Wang and Chen (2010) found that the value of firm-
specific innovations in dynamic environments is lower because firms with such firm-specific 
resources generally have greater difficulty in making necessary adaptations and changes. In 
addition, Wang, He and Mahoney (2009) highlighted that the value of firm-specific knowledge 
might depend on the presence of complementary resources and that firms differ in terms of 
possession of such resources. These studies illustrate that not all firm-specific knowledge is 
equally valuable and that there might be considerable heterogeneity in the value of firm-specific 
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knowledge across firms. Hence, it becomes important for an acquirer to assess the value potential 
of the target’s assets in general and its firm-specific knowledge in particular. 
 However, acquirers are likely to face considerable information asymmetry that pertains to 
the value of the target’s firm-specific knowledge. Acquirers generally face challenges in evaluating 
their potential targets (e.g., Aboody & Lev, 2000; Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Reuer & Ragozzino, 
2008; Cuypers, Cuypers & Martin, 2017). These challenges are likely to be even greater when the 
targets have high levels of firm-specific knowledge. As firm-specific knowledge is often tacit in 
nature and tailed to a specific organizational context (e.g., Wang et al., 2009; Wang, et al., 2016), 
this makes it particularly difficult to understand and assess for outsiders.  
To cope with information asymmetry that results due to the difficulties associated with the 
valuation of firm-specific knowledge, the acquirer is likely to look for information queues which 
signal the value of the target firm and its firm-specific knowledge. One such important information 
cue is the target’s financial performance prior to the acquisition. The target’s past performance can 
signal the quality of the target’s knowledge base and thereby mitigate some of the acquirer’s 
concerns due to information asymmetry. Indeed, several studies have shown a direct link between 
target’s pre-acquisition performance and the quality of their resources (e.g., Hambrick & Cannela, 
1993; Wulf & Singh, 2011). Hence, the target’s firm-specific knowledge is more likely to be 
perceived to be of value by the acquirer if the target has stronger pre-acquisition performance.  
As we argued before, retaining the CEO is likely to be important to facilitate the 
preservation of firm-specific knowledge and potential transfer of the knowledge from the target to 
the acquirer. Therefore, an acquirer is likely to see more benefits in retaining the CEO for a given 
level of firm-specific knowledge if there are clear indications that this knowledge has high value 
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potential. Considering that the target’s past performance is likely to act as a signal of the value of 
the target’s firm-specific knowledge, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between a target’s pre-acquisition firm-specific 
knowledge resources and the retention of its CEO after an acquisition is 
strengthened by the target’s pre-acquisition financial performances. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample 
 To test our hypotheses, we drew from multiple databases. We started constructing our 
sample by identifying acquisitions using Thompson Reuters’ Securities Data Corporation (SDC). 
We identified all deals that have US target firms. We also only focused on deals that were 
completed and in which the acquirer took a majority ownership stake in the target and we omitted 
deals that were mergers of equals given the nature of our research question. Furthermore, we 
filtered out deals labeled as self-tender, share repurchase, leveraged-buyouts (LBOs), and that 
involved financial acquirers. 
Next, we used the NBER patents file compiled by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). This 
database tracks nearly all patents granted to US firms until 2006. We matched this data to the target 
firms that we derived from SDC. As we will detail below, the merged data enable us to calculate 
our firm-specific knowledge measure for the targets we obtained from SDC (and which we were 
able to match to the NBER patents file with confidence). To obtain information on the departure 
of CEOs and CEO characteristics in general for the acquisitions deals for which we have matched 
with NBER patent data, we used various commonly used sources: BroadEx, Compustat Annual 
Execucomp, Bloomberg, LinkedIn, and press releases obtained through Factiva (e.g., Custodio et 
al., 2013). Finally, we obtained additional financial data from Compustat North America Annual 
Financial Database. 
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 Using the above filters resulted in a sample of 117 acquisitions between 1995 and 2006 for 
which we have complete data on all variables. This sample size is comparable to extant studies on 
target CEO retention.22 
Dependent Variable 
Consistent with other studies that have looked at CEO retention (e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011), 
our dependent variable is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO was retained in any managerial 
capacity by the acquirer one year after the completion of the acquisition, and 0 otherwise.23 
Specifically, to calculate this measure, we used data from BoardEx and Bloomberg. Unlike 
acquiring firm’s proxy statement filings, this allows us to verify if the CEO was retained in any 
managerial capacity. We further verify each case using press releases and media reports from 
Factiva.  
 As we will elaborate in the robustness section, we have used alternative specification of 
our dependent variable to check the robustness of our findings including using a specification 
based on a two-year window. 
Independent Variables  
Target Firm-specific knowledge (H1, H2, and H3): Following previous studies (e.g., Wang 
et al., 2009), we calculate target’s pre-acquisition firm-specific knowledge using patent and 
citations data. This measure is based on the premise that firm-specific knowledge is often the 
                                                          
22 Our sample is slightly smaller than Wulf and Singh’s (2011) sample that consists out of 188 deals, Bergh’s (2001) 
sample that consists out of 124 deals, and Buchholtz et al.’s (2003) sample that consists out of 181 deals. This is due 
to the having to match the CEO and acquisition data with additional patent data which is only available in a consistent 
and reliable way until 2006. Having to combine additional data sources with the acquisition data compared to other 
studies explains why the size of final sample size is slightly smaller. 
23 As discussed in more detail in for example Buchholtz, Ribbens, and Houle (2003: 509), for non-retention cases. it 
generally is impossible to infer whether the target CEO’s departure is voluntary or not. While the same limitation may 
apply to our paper, we believe that it is less of a concern. In particular, we expect that firm specific knowledge reduces 
the likelihood of both voluntary departure and dismissal. Namely, as we argued in our baseline prediction, we expect 
the target CEO to be more valuable for the acquirer when there is more firm-specific knowledge in the target. This 
will reduce both the incentives for the acquirer to dismiss the target CEO, and the incentives for the target CEO to 
depart voluntarily. Hence, voluntary turnover is less likely in our case and it is less essential to differentiate between 
voluntary and involuntary CEO turnover.  
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outcome of searching and accumulating new knowledge on top of a firm’s established knowledge 
base (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Wang et al., 2015). Patents provide information on a firm’s 
existing and newly created knowledge as well as information on the path of knowledge flows. A 
higher frequency with which a firm’s existing patents cite its own previous patents (vs. citing other 
firms’ patents) indicates a higher degree to which the firm’s new knowledge is built on its own 
knowledge base. Thus, a higher frequency of backward self-citations thus suggests higher level of 
firm-specific knowledge.  
Accordingly, the base measure of firm-specific knowledge is the number of prior backward 
self-citations made (adjusted by the number of employees) for a firm’s patents in a given year.24 
Furthermore, to account for variations in firm patent filling patterns over time, we reconstruct the 
measure using a three-year window preceding the focal acquisition year. To do so, we calculate 
the three-year average with a 15% yearly depreciation rate (e.g., Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005; 
Kaul, 2012). In particular: 
Firm-specific Knowledge = (0.85 ² x FSKt-3 + 0.85 x FSKt-2 + FSKt-1) / 3 
We believe that using a multi-year measure is more appropriate because a firm’s patent 
filing pattern varies from year to year; furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that the level of self-
citations in knowledge creation is not constant over time. Thus, a three-year lag average measure 
reduces the probability that the measured firm-specific knowledge level in a given year is due to 
an anomaly.  
                                                          
24 Previous studies (e.g., Wang et al., 2015) have also looked at the degree of firm-specific knowledge (i.e. the share 
of backward self-citations made by the firm over the firm’s total citations). However, in the context of acquisitions 
we believe that an absolute measure of firm-specific knowledge, rather than a relative measure, is more appropriate 
as acquirers are more likely to be interested in how much firm-specific knowledge there is in the target. We 
nevertheless check the robustness of our results using a measure that captures the degree of firm-specific knowledge. 
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As we will discuss in the robustness section, we also tested the robustness of our results 
using several alternative specifications of our Firm-Specific Knowledge measures including using 
a measure that captures the degree of firm-specific knowledge (i.e. the share of backward self-
citations made by the firm over the firm’s total citations) rather than the absolute level of firm-
specific knowledge, a longer estimation window, and using an undiscounted measure. 
Target CEO’s Tenure (H2): We measure target’s CEO tenure as the number of years that 
a target CEO has served in this position at the time of the acquisition (Wulf & Singh, 2011), using 
data from S&P Compustat Execucomp and BoardEx databases. Subsequently, we also verified our 
measure using additional data from Bloomberg, LinkedIn, and press releases obtained from 
Factiva.  
Target Pre-acquisition Financial Performance (H3): Consistent with several recent studies 
(e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011; Wang et al., 2017), we measure the target’s pre-acquisition financial 
performance as its industry median adjusted return on assets (ROA) one year preceding the 
acquisition. We also check the robustness of findings using a measure that uses the average of the 
target’s industry median adjusted return on assets (ROA) in the three-year window preceding the 
acquisition. 
Control Variables 
 We control for several other factors at the acquirer-, target--, deal- and CEO-level that 
might influence the likelihood the target CEO is retained or dismissed. First, we control for the 
target’s R&D intensity using target’s R&D expenditures adjusted for firm size, measured one year 
before the acquisition (e.g., Hall et al., 2005). Second, as larger firms may differ from smaller 
firms in terms of the unique managerial skills they require (e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011), we also 
controlled for the target’s size. Specifically, we capture target size using the natural logarithm of 
its assets in the year preceding the acquisition. Third, the relative size of target vis a vis acquirer 
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has been shown to influence CEO retention (e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011). Therefore, we capture 
relative size using the ratio of target’s assets relative to those of the acquirer. Fourth, we control 
for target’s level of diversification (Wang & Barney, 2006). To do so, we use a count of the number 
of 4-digit SIC codes in which it operated at the time of the acquisition (Cuypers et al., 2017). Fifth, 
we also include the Target Patent Count, calculated as the three-year total patents filed by the 
target firm one year before the deal, to account for the possibility that target firm with rich patent 
resource stock may motivate target CEO retention (Bergh, 2001; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Sixth, 
we also control for the number of firms that share the same 4-digit SIC code with the target at the 
time of acquisition. We label this variable Target Peers. The number of firms in the same industry 
as the target provides a proxy for the labor market conditions for target CEOs. It is conceivable 
that target CEOs from industries with abundant potential employers may be more likely to depart 
in pursuit of more attractive positions given the uncertain environment following an acquisition 
(Cappelli & Hamori, 2013). Seventh, as previous studies have found a relationship between the 
target CEO age and post-acquisition retention (e.g., Buchholtz et al., 2003), we control for the age 
of target’s CEO.  Eighth, we control for CEO duality using a dummy variable which is coded 1 if 
the target CEO also serves as chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Ninth, to control for CEO 
competence, we use the natural logarithm of the target CEO’s total compensation one year before 
the deal (Wulf & Singh, 2011). Tenth, we control for the time to completion by the number of days 
between the deal announcement date and the completion date divided by 100 (Wulf & Singh, 2011). 
Eleventh, as target CEO might be more likely to depart following a cross-border deal than a 
domestic one (Krug & Hegarty, 1997; Krug & Nigh, 1998), we include a dummy variable that 
captures whether a deal is cross-border or domestic. This dummy variable is coded 1 if the deal is 
cross-border and 0 if the deal is domestic. Twelfth, we account for whether the deal is a tender 
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offer using a dummy variable which is coded 1 if the deal is a tender offer and 0 otherwise. 
Thirteenth, we control for deal relatedness using a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
the acquirer and target share the same two digits primary SIC industry code (e.g., Bergh, 2001). 
Fourteenth, we control for the acquirer’s acquisition experience. Specifically, we count the total 
number of completed acquisitions made by the acquirer in the past 5 years preceding the focal deal. 
Fifteenth, we capture acquirer size using the natural logarithm of its assets in the year preceding 
the acquisition. Sixteenth, we also control for the acquirer pre-acquisition financial performance 
using its return on assets (ROA) one year preceding the acquisition.25 Seventeenth, paralleling our 
measure of target diversification, we use the count of the number of 4-digit SIC codes, in which 
the acquirer operated at the time of the acquisition to account for acquirer’s diversification level 
(e.g., Cuypers et al., 2017). Finally, we also include year fixed-effects. 
Estimation Approaches 
As our dependent variable is binary in nature, we use both logistic regression and linear 
probability models (LPM) to test our hypotheses. While logistic regression is more commonly 
used for binary dependent variable, researchers have noted that the interpretation of the practical 
magnitude of any findings and of interaction effects can be problematic in non-linear models such 
as logistic regression (e.g., Ai & Norton, 2003; Hoetker, 2007; Zelner, 2009; Greene, 2010).   
In contrast, linear probability models do not suffer from these issues and allow for a more 
intuitive interpretation of interaction effects and the practical magnitude of any findings. Therefore, 
linear probability models are commonly used in economics (e.g., Wooldridge, 2012) and are 
becoming increasingly common in strategy research (e.g., Carnahan, Agarwal, & Campbell, 2012; 
                                                          
25 While an industry adjusted measure of ROA might better capture the acquirer’s financial performance, we are not 
able to do so as some of our acquirers (contrary to our targets who are all U.S. firms) are foreign for which we cannot 
calculate the industry-level ROA. Therefore, we have opted to use a non-adjusted ROA specification to capture the 
acquirer’s performance. 
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Conti, Gambardella, & Mariani, 2013; Reitzig & Sorenson, 2013; Ganco, Ziedonis, & Agarwal, 
2015; Chatain & Meyer-Doyle, 2017; Silverman & Ingram, 2017).  
We present the estimated coefficients using a linear probability models alongside those 
estimated using logistic regression. This allows us to plot our interaction effects and interpret the 
practical magnitude of our findings in a more straightforward way, while at the same time showing 
that our results are consistent across both estimation approaches. Finally, to adjust for possible 
non-independence of observations that involve the same acquirer, we report clustered robust 
standard errors.  
 
RESULTS 
In Table 1, we provide the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. The correlations 
do not point to serious problems with collinearity. We observe in Table 1 that in our sample, the 
average target CEO retention rate one year after the completion of the acquisition is about 31%. 
This rate is in line with other studies on CEO retention after acquisitions (e.g., Walsh, 1988; 
Hambrick & Cannela, 1993). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we also observe positive and 
significant correlations between Firm-Specific Knowledge (ρ = 0.33, p < 0.01) and CEO retention 
rate one year after the completion of the acquisition.  
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
To further explore this, we conduct some univariate analysis by looking at the differences 
at the mean values of the level of firm-specific knowledge across sub-samples. Specifically, we 
compare the mean values of the level of firm-specific knowledge in a subsample of acquisitions in 
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which target CEO is not retained with the mean values in a subsample in which target CEO is 
retained. This reveals similar patterns. Namely, we find that the mean level of firm-specific 
knowledge is statistically (p < 0.001) higher when a CEO is retained (mean = 5.575) one year after 
deal completion than when a CEO is not retained (mean = 1.210). This univariate finding is in line 
with Hypothesis 1.  
 Table 2 presents the results of the logit regression and the linear probability models. Model 
1 shows the baseline model including all control variables. In Model 2, we introduce the Firm-
Specific Knowledge measure to test the Hypothesis 1. Finally, in models 3 and 4 we introduce our 
interaction terms. 
Some of the significant control variables in models 1a and 1b are worth mentioning. First, 
we find that respectively, target R&D intensity (p-value = 0.006 in Model 1a, p-value = 0.001 in 
Model 1b) and target pre-acquisition performance (p-value = 0.005 in Model 1a, p-value = 0.012 
in Model 1b) are positively and significantly related to CEO retention. We also observe that target 
CEO tenure alone in both models is not significantly related to post-acquisition target CEO 
retention decisions (p-value = 0.995 in Model 1a, p-value = 0.936 in Model 1b). These findings 
are consistent with those found in prior studies (e.g., Bergh, 2001; Wulf & Singh, 2011). In 
addition, we find that the number of peer firms in target’s industry is significant (p-value = 0.039 
in Model 1a, p-value = 0.076 in Model 1b) and negatively associated with our dependent variable.  
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
In models 2a and 2b, we find a positive and significant (p-value = 0.002 in the Model 2a 
and p-value < 0.001 in Model 2b) relationship between Firm-Specific Knowledge and CEO 
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retention, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. In terms of the practical magnitude of this effect, 
a one standard deviation change in the target firm’s Firm-Specific Knowledge is associated with a 
15.25% increase in the probability of the CEO being retained (Model 2b).  
In models 3a and 3b, we look at the moderating effect of the target’s CEO tenure. In line 
with Hypothesis 2, target CEO tenure positively moderates (i.e. strengthens) (p-value = 0.007 in 
Model 3a, p-value = 0.003 in Model 3b) the relationship between Firm-Specific Knowledge and 
the likelihood of CEO retention. 
Next, in models 4a and 4b, we look at the moderating effect of target’s pre-acquisition 
financial performance. We find, as predicted in Hypothesis 3, that target’s pre-acquisition financial 
performance positively moderates (i.e. strengthens) (p-value = 0.003 in Model 4a, p-value < 0.001 
in Model 4b) the relationship between Firm-Specific Knowledge and the likelihood of CEO 
retention. We also added in both interaction terms simultaneously in separate models. However, 
doing so seems to cause collinearity issues and therefore we opted to focus on the models with 
each of the interaction terms added in individually.26  
To facilitate the interpretation of our interaction effects, we plotted our two interaction 
effects in Figures 1 and 2. Specifically, Figure 1 is based on the estimates of Model 3b and Figure 
2 is based on the estimates of Model 4b. In each figure the y-axis measures the probability that the 
                                                          
26 Specifically, we ran a logit and LPM model with both interaction terms included simultaneously. In these models, 
we continue to find a positive and significant moderating effects for Target ROA (p < 0.05 in the logit model, p < 0.05 
in the LPM) but we fail to find consistent support for the moderating effect for Target’s CEO Tenure (p = 0.091 in the 
logit model, p = 0.736 in the LPM). However, we also observed that the standard errors of several of the variables in 
these models increased drastically which might be an indicator of collinearity issues (Boyd, Gove & Hitt, 2005; 
Godfrey & Hill, 1995; Pearson, 1920). To further explore this potential issue, we have conducted two tests: the 
conditional number test and the Farrar-Glauber test. The conditional number test yielded values above 30 which 
indicates that the estimated models might suffer from significant collinearity issues. Similarly, Farrar-Glauber also 
suggested that the models are suffering from collinearity (p < 0.001). Mean-centering our interaction effects did not 
resolve any of these issues. Therefore, as high levels of collinearity might lead to Type II errors (i.e. failing to reject 
the null hypothesis while it is false), we believe that the models with only a single interaction term included at a time 
provide more reliable estimates.  
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target CEO is retained, while the x-axis represents the target’s level of firm-specific knowledge. 
The lines that depict the interactions effects are plotted by setting the moderators at a high (1 
standard deviation above the mean) and low (1 standard deviation below the mean) level. The 
practical examination of our interaction effects in Figures 1 and 2 support our statistical inference. 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1, and 2 here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
   
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Alternative Specification of the Firm-Specific Knowledge Variable 
First, we first checked the robustness of our main findings using an alternative measure of 
firm specific knowledge. Instead of using a measure that captures the absolute level of firm-
specific knowledge, we use a measure that captures the degree of firm specific knowledge (Wang 
et al., 2015; 2017). Specifically, this alternative measure is calculated by counting all citations 
made in a firm’s new patents that cite the firm’s own previous patents and dividing it by the total 
number of citations made by the firm in the same period. Hence:  
 
Degree of Firm-Specific Knowledge = Share of backward self-citations (over total 
citations) made by the focal firm.  
 
Similar to our main variable, we adopted a three-year lag average measure. While the main 
effect of Degree of Firm-Specific Knowledge has a strong and positive relationship with target 
CEO’s retention (p < 0.001 in both models), neither moderators appear to be significant.   
Additionally, in our main analysis, we discounted our Firm-Specific Knowledge measure 
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using a 15% discount rate. Here, we have also checked the robustness of our findings using a 
measure that is calculated without any discounting. We continue to find a positive and significant 
(p = 0.002 in the logit model, p < 0.001 in the LPM) direct effect as well as positive and significant 
moderating effects for Target’s CEO Tenure (p = 0.006 in the logit model, p = 0.001 in the LPM) 
and Target ROA (p = 0.003 in the logit model, p < 0.001 in the LPM). 
Alternative Specification of the Dependent Variable 
We also checked the robustness of our findings using an alternative specification of our 
dependent variable. Specifically, following Wulf and Singh (2011), we also use a measure that 
captures target CEO retention two years after deal completion instead of the one-year measure we 
used in our main analysis. This yielded results that are consistent with our main analysis. 
Specifically, we find a significant and positive association between, Firm-Specific Knowledge (p 
= 0.004 in the logit model, p = 0.001 in the LPM) and CEO retention two years after deal 
completion. We also find positive moderating effects for both target CEO tenure (p = 0.012 in the 
logit model, p < 0.001 in the LPM) and target’s pre-acquisition financial performance (p = 0.002 
in the logit model, p = 0.001 in the LPM).  
In sum, our findings remain robust using these alternative specifications of our Firm-
Specific Knowledge measures. 
Alternative Specification of the Target Pre-acquisition Financial Performance 
Instead of only one year preceding the acquisition, we took the three-year average of 
target’s industry adjusted ROA. This change does not affect the significant level of the moderating 
effect (p = 0.002 in the logit model, p = 0.008 in the LPM).  
Ownership Levels in the Target 
In our main sample we only have deals in which the acquirer took a majority share. The 
overwhelming majority (99.7%) of these deals are full acquisitions (i.e. deals in which the acquirer 
took 100% ownership in the target) which does not provide us enough variance to control for this 
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in our main models. Therefore, we checked the robustness of our findings using a sub-sample of 
only full acquisitions. This again yields a positive and significant (p = 0.001 in the logit model, p 
= 0.001 in the LPM) direct effect as well as positive and significant moderating effects for Target’s 
CEO Tenure (p = 0.014 in the logit model, p = 0.084 in the LPM) and Target ROA (p = 0.013 in 
the logit model, p = 0.001 in the LPM). 
 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 Target executive retention has been studied extensively from a variety of different 
theoretical perspectives (for a recent review see Bilgili et al., 2017) including agency theory 
(Walsh & Ellwood, 1991; Walsh & Kosnik, 1993), the RBV (Bergh, 2001), and the upper echelons 
theory (Krishnan et al., 1997). The factors considered in this literature are as varied (e.g., Hambrick 
& Cannella, 1993; Krishnan et al., 1997; Lubatkin et al., 1999; Wulf & Singh, 2011). However, 
the specific role of different types of target resources has not been systematically examined. To 
our best knowledge, this study serves as the first attempt to investigate the role of the target firm’s 
resources by examining the influence of its knowledge structure on target CEO post-acquisition 
retention decisions. We therefore aim to fill the void in the target executives post-acquisition 
turnover literatures by introducing a number of recent insights from the literature on firm-specific 
knowledge (e.g., Wang et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2017). Our results suggest that acquirer is more 
likely to retain a CEO from a target with high level of firm-specific knowledge resources.  
In additional to contributing to target CEO post-acquisition retention literature, we also 
extend firm-specific knowledge research which typically has focused on intra-organizational 
settings by considering the role of firm-specific knowledge within a firm. Our study, with a focus 
on the M&A context, provides an opportunity to explore the effects of firm-specific knowledge 
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across firm boundaries. In particular, it extends the discussion of firm-specific knowledge from an 
intra- to an inter-organizational setting by examining how firm-specific knowledge in a target firm 
affects an acquirer’s decision with regard to target CEO retention. Thus, our study opens the door 
for future studies to further examine the role of firm-specific knowledge in other potentially 
relevant inter-organizational contexts, such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, or supply chain 
relationships.   
Furthermore, our finding that the relationship between firm-specific knowledge and target 
CEO retention is strengthened by CEO tenure sheds lights on the literature examining the role of 
CEO tenure on the decision to retain a CEO. Extant literature has largely failed to uncover a direct 
relationship between CEO tenure (as a proxy for firm specific human capital) and post-acquisition 
CEO retention (e.g., Buchholtz et al., 2003; Wulf & Singh, 2011). Our findings suggest that the 
effect of CEO tenure might be more complicated than previously thought as it might play more of 
a role as a moderating factor than a factor that has a direct effect of CEO retention. Specifically, 
our results suggest that CEO tenure moderates the relationship between firm-specific knowledge 
on CEO retention rather than having a direct effect. This finding should encourage future studies 
to examine the role of CEO tenure in more complex ways.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Our study is not without its limitations and we identified several opportunities for future 
research. First, in line with some previous studies (e.g., Wang et al., 2009), we use patent citation 
data to obtain measures of firm-specific knowledge. However, patent only reflects one, albeit 
generally an important aspect of knowledge creation and flows within a firm. However, in some 
cases or environments (e.g., markets with weak regime of intellectual property), a firm may 
develop highly firm-specific knowledge structure without this being completely reflected in patent 
citation patterns. To capture other aspects of knowledge creation and flow within a firm which 
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patents do not fully capture, future studies may want to explore using survey or other means that 
would allow for a more holistic measure of firms’ knowledge structure (e.g., Cohen, Nelson, & 
Walsh, 2000).  
Second, we have examined two moderators (i.e. CEO tenure and target pre-acquisition 
performance) that are expected to affect the relationship between target firm-specific knowledge 
and target CEO turnover. However, some other factors may also be of theoretical interest for future 
research to explore. Specifically, future studies might be able to explore the effect of acquirer 
characteristics or acquirer-target dyadic factors.  
 Despite these limitations and opportunities for future research, this study makes several 
important contributions to the post-acquisition executive turnover and firm-specific knowledge 
literatures by integrating both these literatures.  
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TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
 
 
Variable Name Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16   17 18 19 20 
Target CEO Retention 0.41 0.49                      
Target firm-Specific Knowledge 3.00 6.48 .33                    
Target Patent Count 54.17 121.85 .16  .10                    
Target R&D Intensity 0.09 0.10 .12 .10 -.11                  
Target Industry Adjusted ROA 0.03 0.18 .11 -.17 .02 -.38                 
Target Total Assets (Log) 6.51 1.50 .11 -.16 .57 -.46 .23                
Target Peers 92.47 111.11 -.05 -.05 -.16 .39 .19 -.24               
Target Diversification 4.15 3.08 -.03 -.12 .33 -.35 .04 .56 -.23              
Target CEO Compensation (Log)  7.79 1.08 .09 -.17 .35 -.23 .20 .66 .01 .33             
Target CEO Age 54.32 7.19 -.07 -.13 -.08 -.26 .10 .19 -.25 .17 -.05            
Target CEO Tenure 6.74 5.92 -.11 -.03 -.18 -.06 .18 -.13 .11 -.14 -.15 .27           
Target CEO Duality 0.53 0.50 -.08 -.10 .08 -.14 -.05 .16 -.14 .03 .07 .39 .16          
Time to Completion 1.19 0.72 .17 .12 .45 -.12 -.06 .48 -.08 .32 .25 .06 -.19 .15         
Cross Border Deal 0.21 0.41 .05 -.10 .03 -.20 .07 .21 -.18 .20 .17 .12 -.01 .05 -.01        
Tender Offer 0.27 0.45 -.04 .02 .01 .03 -.10 -.06 -.06 -.01 -.12 -.05 .08 .01 -.23 .26       
Deal Relatedness 0.47 0.50 -.09 .01 .05 .18 -.15 -.02 .25 -.07 -.08 .01 .07 .10 -.01 -.22 -.23      
Target Relative Size 0.19 0.20 -.06 -.10 .33 -.17 .11 .42 -.05 .24 .20 .07 -.01 -.14 .24 -.11 -.08 .10     
Acquirer Total Assets (Log) 8.74 1.84 .02 -.05 .20 -.21 .08 .42 -.12 .25 .36 .03 -.07 .24 .12 .33 .06 -.18 -.49    
Acquirer ROA 0.07 0.09 .03 .05 -.05 -.17 .25 .15 -.09 .01 .10 .03 .06 .05 -.11 .04 .10 -.12 .07 .03   
Acquirer Diversification 7.85 6.83 -.02 -.09 -.01 -.19 .13 .13 -.15 .22 .10 .13 .07 .13 -.07 .23 .12 -20 -.25 .52 .07  
Acquirer Acquisition Experience 18.15 27.56 -.07 -.10 -.02 -.16 .08 .10 -.07 .00 .12 .13 .14 .05 -.18 .22 .16 -.10 -.29 .60 -.05 .50 
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TABLE 2: Logistic Regression and LPMs Predicting Target CEO Retention  
Variables Model 1-A Model 1-B Model 2-A Model 2-B Model 3-A Model 3-B Model 4-A Model 4-B 
  Logit LPM Logit LPM Logit LPM Logit LPM 
Constant -1.585  0.388  -3.163  0.132  -3.571  0.136  -3.140  0.231  
 (3.483) [0.649] (0.719) [0.591] (3.852) [0.412] (0.641) [0.837] (4.279) [0.404] (0.638) [0.832] (4.392) [0.475] (0.630) [0.715] 
Target Patent Count 0.002  2.8e+04  2.8e-04  2.1e-05  5.0e-04  1.2e-06  -0.001  3.2e-05  
 (0.003) [0.514] (0.001) [0.611] (0.003) [0.910] (0.005) [0.966] (0.003) [0.862] (0.000) [0.980] (0.003) [0.742] (0.001) [0.950] 
Target R&D Intensity 10.200 ** 1.594 ** 10.835 ** 1.748 *** 12.213 ** 1.861 *** 12.785 ** 1.874 *** 
 (3.720) [0.006] (0.486) [0.001] (3.946) [0.006] (0.462) [0.000] (4.011) [0.002] (0.467) [0.000] (4.139) [0.002] (0.441) [0.000] 
Target Industry Adjusted ROA 5.347 ** 0.811 * 6.136 ** 0.890 ** 6.900 ** 0.885 ** 4.032 * 0.638 * 
 (1.921) [0.005] (0.317) [0.012] (2.212) [0.006] (0.283) [0.002] (2.421) [0.004] (0.279) [0.002] (1.862) [0.030] (0.280) [0.025] 
Target Total Assets (Log) -0.148  0.004  0.069  0.042  0.051 
 0.042  0.170 
 0.049  
 (0.399) [0.711] (0.079) [0.964] (0.403) [0.864] (0.073) [0.565] (0.406) [0.902] (0.072) [0.561] (0.425) [0.689] (0.072) [0.497] 
Target Peers -0.006 * -0.001 † -0.005 † -0.001  -0.006 † -0.001  -0.006 † -0.001 † 
 (0.003) [0.039] (0.001) [0.076] (0.003) [0.095] (0.000) [0.127] (0.003) [0.052] (0.001) [0.103] (0.003) [0.055] (0.001) [0.096] 
Target Diversification -0.154  -0.023  -0.097  -0.016  -0.124  -0.016  -0.085  -0.011  
 (0.097) [0.111] (0.019) [0.214] (0.105) [0.355] (0.019) [0.426] (0.105) [0.235] (0.019) [0.411] (0.107) [0.429] (0.019) [0.574] 
Target CEO Total Compensation -0.056  -0.005  -0.041  -0.006  -0.095  -0.016  -0.143  -0.026  
 (0.331) [0.867] (0.069) [0.941] (0.361) [0.909] (0.064) [0.925] (0.359) [0.792] (0.064) [0.805] (0.357) [0.688] (0.062) [0.677] 
Target CEO Age -0.036  -0.007  -0.030  -0.006  -0.023  -0.006  -0.020  -0.007  
 (0.045) [0.424] (0.008) [0.404] (0.049) [0.539] (0.007) [0.427] (0.053) [0.658] (0.007) [0.439] (0.053) [0.709] (0.007) [0.333] 
Target CEO Tenure 0.001  -0.001  -0.026  -0.003  -0.101 † -0.007  -0.007 
 -0.002  
 (0.044) [0.994] (0.008) [0.936] (0.045) [0.568] (0.007) [0.697] (0.059) [0.083] (0.007) [0.307] (0.048) [0.878] (0.006) [0.732] 
Target CEO Duality -0.301  -0.045  0.032  -0.001  0.043  -0.002  -0.086  0.006  
 (0.539) [0.577] (0.106) [0.669] (0.566) [0.956] (0.102) [0.996] (0.596) [0.943] (0.101) [0.981] (0.624) [0.891] (0.102) [0.954] 
Time to Completion 0.606  0.105  0.245  0.057  0.185  0.041  -0.054  0.013  
 (0.422) [0.151] (0.075) [0.163] (0.461) [0.596] (0.073) [0.432] (0.461) [0.689] (0.075) [0.589] (0.563) [0.924] (0.801) [0.868] 
Cross Border Deal 1.198  0.179  1.301  0.187  1.543 † 0.200  1.221  0.202  
 (0.764) [0.117] (0.138) [0.197] (0.857) [0.129] (0.133) [0.161] (0.903) [0.087] (0.133) [0.135] (0.843) [0.148] (0.132) [0.131] 
Tender Offer -0.512  -0.061  -0.591  -0.080  -0.664  -0.097  -0.936  -0.142  
 (0.563) [0.363] (0.115) [0.595] (0.685) [0.388] (0.112) [0.475] (0.705) [0.346] (0.112) [0.387] (0.790) [0.236] (0.113) [0.211] 
Deal Relatedness -0.322  -0.055  -0.546  -0.071  -0.462  -0.079  -0.644  -0.081  
 (0.575) [0.575] (0.117) [0.637] (0.653) [0.403] (0.117) [0.550] (0.633) [0.466] (0.117) [0.498] (0.691) [0.351] (0.115) [0.487] 
Target Relative Size 2.783  0.253  3.010  0.275  3.980 † 0.366  3.127  0.342  
  (2.363) [0.239] (0.476) [0.596] (2.307) [0.192] (0.467) [0.558] (2.239) [0.075] (0.474) [0.443] (2.413) [0.195] (0.467) [0.466] 
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Table 2 (continued)    Model 1-A Model 1-B Model 2-A Model 2-B Model 3-A Model 3-B Model 4-A Model 4-B 
        Logit LPM Logit LPM Logit LPM Logit LPM 
Acquirer Total Assets (Log) 0.456  0.039  0.427  0.023  0.533  0.032  0.388  0.027  
 (0.303) [0.132] (0.053) [0.462] (0.303) [0.160] (0.049) [0.640] (0.327) [0.103] (0.050) [0.518] (0.323) [0.230] (0.049) [0.576] 
Acquirer ROA -0.493  -0.019  -1.302  -0.060  -1.054  -0.088  -1.213  -0.096  
 (3.088) [0.873] (0.579) [0.974] (3.437) [0.705] (0.557) [0.914] (3.546) [0.766] (0.545) [0.872] (3.823) [0.751] (0.560) [0.864] 
Acquirer Diversification 0.042  0.006  0.045  0.006  0.033  0.005  0.034  0.003  
 (0.035) [0.238] (0.006) [0.343] (0.040) [0.260] (0.006) [0.349] (0.039) [0.401] (0.006) [0.430] (0.042) [0.420] (0.006) [0.624] 
Acquirer Acquisition Experience -0.022 † -0.002  -0.022  -0.002  -0.020  -0.001  -0.022  -0.001  
 (0.013) [0.096] (0.002) [0.179] (0.014) [0.117] (0.002) [0.363] (0.014) [0.167] (0.002) [0.453] (0.016) [0.180] (0.002) [0.487] 
Target Firm-Specific Knowledge     0.177 ** 0.024 *** -0.033  0.010  0.379 ** 0.032 *** 
     (0.056) [0.002] (0.006) [0.000] (0.063) [0.598] (0.007) [0.168] (0.125) [0.002] (0.005) [0.000] 
Target Firm-Specific Knowledge         0.050 ** 0.002 **     
x Target CEO Tenure         (0.019) [0.007] (0.001) [0.003]     
Target Firm-Specific Knowledge         
 
 
 
 0.997 ** 0.075 *** 
x Target Industry Adjusted ROA         
 
 
 
 (0.332) [0.003] (0.019) [0.000] 
Year Fixed Effects              Included         Included  Included Included    Included   Included   Included Included 
                                  
Observations 117  117  117  117  117  117  117  117  
Log likelihood -58.91     -52.85     -50.55     -48.96    
R-Squared    0.291       0.363      0.381      0.401   
 
All tests are two-tailed. Estimated coefficients are in bold. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. P−values are between square brackets.  
† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01*** p < .001 
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FIGURE 1: Plot of The Interaction Between Target Firm-Specific Knowledge and Target 
CEO’S Tenure 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Plot of The Interaction Between Target Firm-Specific Knowledge and Target 
Pre-acquisition Financial Performance 
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Chapter 4 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
     In this dissertation, I examined antecedents as well as consequences of acquisition that may 
influence acquisition success. The conclusion from the second chapter suggests that the 
behavioral antecedents for acquisition is far more complicated than previously expected. While 
previous studies have found a positive relationship between acquisition performance feedback 
and subsequent action (Haleblian et al., 2006), I uncover the opposite effect when considering a 
series of recent feedbacks together (Arikan & McGahn, 2010). As negative performance 
feedback is associated with increased risk-taking behavior, problemistic search conducted under 
such circumstances is likely to choose the potential solution with the highest risk. Because it is 
considered as the last resort after all other solutions have been exhausted, acquisition conducted 
under such condition is likely to be desperate, which may force flawed deals through or pay 
hefty premiums (Haleblain et al., 2011) and end up destroying rather than creating value. From 
the third chapter, we can conclude that acquirer is more likely to retain target firm’s CEO when 
the target firm has developed a highly specific knowledge structure. Because of the indispensable 
value brought by target firm’s CEO, acquirers that fail to retain target firm’s CEO are likely to 
suffer in the post-acquisition integration process.  
     In addition to acquisition success, there are significant implications to be drawn about our 
understanding regarding the coevolution of M&A antecedents and outcomes. Acquisition 
outcomes can be separated between those that affect decision making stakeholders and those that 
affect bystander stakeholders. The former includes decision makers who are responsible for 
acquisition decisions at the top echelon position within an organization, while the latter only 
refers to those stakeholders such as employees, customers, alliance partners, and bondholders 
who are affected by acquisition but have no say in the process.  
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     Agency theory suggests that decision making stakeholders are likely to make acquisition 
decisions that maximize their personal interests instead of the interests of the firm (Jensen, 
1986). One of the key implications from my research lies in how acquisition outcomes may 
influence the stakeholders who are decision makers involved in the previous deal. Driven by a 
combination of motives for problemistic solution search and risk seeking to recover personal 
wealth in a loss frame, future acquisition behaviors are inextricably linked to performance 
feedback in prior deals. Because decision making stakeholders are personally responsible for the 
prior alliances and acquisitions, unlike new CEO, they are more likely to escalate their 
commitments through increased resource investments (Staw, 1976, 1981) rather than admitting 
fault through divestitures (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006; Feldman, 2014). This is especially 
pertinent to corporate acquisition decisions as poor acquisition performance is linked to higher 
likelihood of CEO dismissal (Lehn & Zhao, 2006). Similarly, as target CEOs are more likely to 
be retained when the target firm has developed a firm-specific knowledge structure, compared to 
target CEOs who are subject to heightened risks of unemployment, they might be more likely to 
agree to acquisition requests. A potential remedy is to separate decision makers from the direct 
consequences of their decision making to a degree that they are not incentivized to take 
excessive risks when it is unwarranted. 
     It will be interesting for future research to study the performance implications for acquisitions 
that have the blessings of bystander stakeholders such as labor unions or borrowers. On one 
hand, stakeholder cooperation is desirable and conducive to better firm performance (Bosse, 
Phillips, & Harrison, 2010; Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010). On the other hand, because 
acquisition synergies hinge on disruptive integration and restructuring that often necessitate mass 
layoffs, it might not be helpful to only pursue deals that the labor union agrees with (Zollo et al., 
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2018). In the same vein, an interesting future research question to ask is to inquire whether 
acquisitions taken following risk taking and problemistic search are likely to underperform. Both 
BTF and prospect theory make predictions on the actions following performance feedback but 
remain largely silent on the consequences of such actions. Taking into account the behavioral 
motives behind acquisitions would yield new insights about acquisition performance.  
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